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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-
2(3)0(1996). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
I. As a matter of law and undisputed fact, did the plaintiffs (the "Smiths") suffer 
any damages that were caused by the alleged breaches of contract and breaches of fiduciary 
duty on the part of the defendants ("Fairfax") where Fairfax took the only alternative 
available to save the property at issue in this case from a total loss—contributing the 
property to a real estate investment trust ("REIT")?l 
Standard of Review: In reviewing the Trial Court's denial of a motion for a 
directed verdict, this Court reviews "the evidence and all reasonable inferences that may 
fairly be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to [the Smiths], and will sustain the 
denial if reasonable minds could disagree with the ground asserted for directing a 
verdict." Mahmood v. Ross, 1999 UT 104, ]|16, 990 P.2d 933. 
II. Did the Trial Court err in submitting the issue of punitive damages to the jury 
in the absence of evidence that Fairfax willfully and deliberately disregarded the rights of 
the Smiths in a way that proximately caused injury?2 
Issue preserved at R 1736-39 (summary judgment motion); 4538 at 4-9, 55-56 (oral 
argument and ruling); 3202-03 (ruling); 1706-08, 3116-19 (motion in limine re: REIT 
damages); 1922-2009, 3129-32 (motion in limine re: Howden); 2013-19, 3120-28 
(motion in limine re: Norman); 4538 at 56 (oral argument); 3201-04 (ruling); 4545 at 
1002-08 (directed verdict motion); 4545 at 1014 (ruling); 4551 at 2034 (directed verdict 
motion); 4551 at 2035 (ruling); 4551 at 2132 (instruction objections); 3754-63, 3782-88, 
4265-80 (j.n.o.v. motion); 4508 (ruling). 
2
 Issue preserved at R 4545 at 1002-05 (directed verdict motion); 4545 at 1014 (ruling); 
1 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Standard of Review: A trial court's determination of whether sufficient evidence 
has been shown to submit a claim of punitive damages to a jury is a question of law, 
reviewed by courts de novo. See Woodworker's Supply, Inc. v. Principal Mut. Life Ins. 
Co., 170 F.3d 985, 995 (10th Cir. 1999). 
III. Was the jury's punitive damage award excessive?3 
Standard of Reviews The Trial Court's decision in this regard is reviewed for 
correctness and is given no deference. Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2001 
UT 89, If 13, 15, 432 Utah Adv. Rep. 44. 
IV. Did the Trial Court err in submitting the issue of prejudgment interest to the 
jury and in entering a judgment including prejudgment interest; alternatively, was the 
evidence sufficient to support the amount of the jury's award of prejudgment interest? 
Standard of Review: Entitlement to prejudgment interest is a question of law 
reviewed for correctness. Lyon v. Burton, 2000 UT 19, ^ [73, 5 P.3d 616. Evidence is 
insufficient to support a verdict "if, taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
prevailing party, the appellant demonstrates that the findings lack substantial evidentiary 
support." Water & Energy Sys. Tech., Inc. v. Keil, 2002 UT 32, T[15, 48 P.3d 888. 
4541 at 2034 (directed verdict motion); 4541 at 2035 (ruling); 4551 at 2133, 2139 
(instruction objections); 3754-67, 3782-88, 4265-80 (j.n.o.v. motion); 4508 (ruling). 
3
 Issue preserved at R 3738-3811, 4157-262 (motion for new trial or remittitur); 4553 at 
3-27, 55-58 (oral argument); 4509-10 (ruling); 4352-4407, 4469-75 (special finding 
objections); 4510 (ruling); 4493-98 (special findings). 
4
 Issue preserved at R 1709-15, 3207-24 (motion in limine); 4538 at 61-65, 68 (oral 
argument); 3511-12 (ruling); 4539 at 92-99 (trial argument and ruling); 4551 at 2132, 
2137, 2139 (instruction objections); 3720 (Instruction No. 44); 3799-3801, 4168-69 
(motion for new trial or remittitur); 4553 at 28 (argument); 4509-10 (ruling). 
2 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
There are no constitutional provisions or statutes whose interpretation is 
determinative or of central importance to this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below 
This case is a business dispute between partners regarding actions taken to save an 
insolvent New Mexico shopping mall (the "Mall") from imminent foreclosure. As the only 
alternative to avoid such foreclosure or bankruptcy, the appellant, Fairfax Realty, Inc. 
("Fairfax"), the general partner of two limited partnerships (the "Partnerships"), conveyed 
the Mall to a Real Estate Investment Trust ("REIT") that Fairfax was creating for other 
properties in which it owned an interest in exchange for shares in the REIT. 
The plaintiffs (the "Smiths"), who are limited partners holding a 15% interest in the 
Partnerships, complained that Fairfax breached the partnership agreements by contributing 
the Mall to the REIT without obtaining the Smiths' consent and without obtaining fair 
market, appraised value for the Mall. The Smiths also asserted that Fairfax breached its 
fiduciary duty as a general partner by engaging in "self-dealing" and by failing to disclose 
infomiation regarding the REIT. Finally, the Smiths alleged that, inasmuch as Fairfax had 
breached its contractual and fiduciary duties, the contribution of the Mall to the REIT 
constituted conversion. However, the Smiths offered no evidence of any alternative course 
to save the Mall from foreclosure or bankruptcy. Rather, the Smiths merely assumed that 
the Mall could somehow have been sold for its fair market, appraised value prior to 
foreclosure despite five years of unsuccessful attempts to do so. 
3 
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The Smiths also alleged that they were entitled to punitive damages, arguing that 
Fairfax misled them into thinking they had several options with respect to the REIT (while 
unilaterally deciding to proceed with the REIT), that Fairfax failed to disclose information 
about the REIT, that Fairfax's management fee was too high, that Fairfax selectively 
accrued interest on the partners' loans to the Partnerships, and that Fairfax wrongfully 
combined bank accounts, including those of the Partnerships. 
After a fourteen-day trial, the jury awarded the Smiths $410,000 in compensatory 
damages. The jury also awarded $690,000 for prejudgment interest damages—$92,000 
more than the amount for which the Smiths presented evidence. The jury then awarded 
$5,500,000 in punitive damages. 
In response to Fairfax's post-trial motions, the Trial Court entered judgment on the 
jury verdict, affirmed the prejudgment interest award, and, without referencing the 
controlling factors announced by this Court in Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exchange, 817 P.2d 
789 (Utah 1991) ("Crookston I") to justify the excessive punitive damages award, affimied 
the punitive damage award. 
II. Facts 
1. Creation of the Partnerships. In the early 1980s, Fairfax (then known as Price 
Development Company) purchased a 33-acre parcel in Clovis, New Mexico, from Armand 
Smith ("Smith") and others, in exchange for $2 million and a 15% interest in two limited 
partnerships—North Plains Development Company, Ltd. and North Plains Land Company, 
Ltd. (the "Partnerships"), which were to build and operate a shopping center (the "Mall") on 
4 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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the land.5 (R 4541 at 403-04; 4549 at 1809-10.) A copy of one of the two (substantially 
identical) partnership agreements is included in the Addendum at Tab L. 
2. Construction and Operation of Mall. The Mall was constructed with a 
$9 million interim loan from Wells Fargo Realty Advisors. (D-256; R 4549 at 1812.) In 
October 1989, that loan was paid with the proceeds of a $12 million short-term loan from 
Chemical Bank, which matured in October 1991. (D-272; D-279; R 4545 at 1059.) 
After the Mall opened in October 1985, it soon experienced operating deficits for a 
variety of reasons. (R 4539 at 199; P-34.) In order to fund those operating deficits and to 
finance additional construction, a "capital call" was made on the partners in December 
Fairfax had a 5% general partner interest in the Partnerships. The remaining interests 
were allocated to limited partners as follows: Smith and related trusts (15%), Fairfax 
(15%), John Price—the principal of Fairfax—and related trusts (55%), and NP 
Investment Company—consisting of persons related to Fairfax (10%). (P-15 at art. 4.) 
Thereafter, Smith conveyed a portion of his interest to Virginia Smith, as part of a divorce. 
(P-56.) Armand and Virginia Smith will be collectively referred to as "the Smiths." The 
Smiths stipulated at trial that Smith was the agent of his former wife with respect to the 
Partnerships. (R4549 at 1850-59, 1862.) 
A number of contract provisions in the partnership agreements were in dispute at trial. 
However, because damages were awarded on non-contract claims and because of space 
limitations in this brief, Fairfax will not address arguments that relate solely to the 
breach-of-contract claims. To the extent necessaiy to provide context, Fairfax will 
address specific contract provisions at relevant places below. 
Under the partnership agreements, "capital contributions" were placed in "separate 
capital accounts for each Partner,'1 and did not accme interest. (P-15 at section 4.) After 
the initial capital contributions, the Mall was to be constructed and operated out of, first, 
construction and permanent financing and operating revenues, second, interim "gap" 
loans, and, if necessary, third, through loans from or "capital calls" on each partner in 
proportion to their ownership. (Id. at §§ 8.2, 9.4.) However, such loans could be repaid 
by the Partnerships only out of "net spendable income" after (1) payment of operating 
expenses, (2) payment of due loan payments, and (3) "adequate provision" for "working 
capital requirements." (Id. at § 9.3.) For a period of time, Fairfax's internal accounting for 
the Partnerships accrued (but did not pay) interest on Fairfax's capital call but not on the 
5 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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1989—51,294,210 from Fairfax and $228,390 from the Smiths. (P-34.) In addition, to 
cover the Partnerships' continuing operating deficits, Fairfax thereafter obtained "gap loans" 
in accordance with Section 9.2(a) and (b) of the partnership agreements, of approximately 
$1.5 million from its own bank line and advanced those funds as a loan to the Partnerships.8 
(R 4545 at 1115-16; 4550 at 1911-12; D-282). 
3. Fairfax's Efforts to Refinance or Sell the Mall. Beginning in 1988, Fairfax 
undertook substantial efforts through its primary financing sources and through a national 
broker, Sonnenblick-Goldman, to secure a permanent loan or other financing arrangements, 
including a possible sale9 of the Mall. (R 4545 at 1061-62; 4548 at 1592-94; 4550 at 1898-
99,1914,1929.) In June 1991, as the maturity of the Chemical Bank loan approached, 
Fairfax engaged another national broker, Cushman & Wakefield, to seek other financing 
Smiths' capital call. In the end, neither Fairfax nor the Smiths were paid back their capital 
calls or interest thereon, and the interest was backed out. (R 4544 at 921, 923, 937; 4548 at 
1684-85, 1772-73; 4550 at 2002-03.) The Smiths never established that any other treatment 
of these contributions would have resulted in any more value to the Smiths under the REIT. 
o 
The Smiths claimed that such loans violated the partnership agreements because the 
Smiths were not given "notice" of these allegedly "significant borrowings." (R 4541 at 
416-18; see also P-15 at § 4.5.) Fairfax claimed that it did not view such gap loans as 
"significant borrowings," and, in any event, such loans were shown on the Partnerships' 
operating statements given to the Smiths. (R 4541 at 425; 4550 at 1897.) The gap loans 
accrued interest at the rate charged to Fairfax by its bank, rather than the higher interest 
rate applicable to "capital calls." (R 4545 at 1060, 1115-16.) 
9
 The Smiths pointed out that a cash sale of the Mall could have resulted in adverse tax 
consequences to Price (not relevant to the REIT) so that he allegedly had a disincentive to 
try to sell the Mall. (R 4547 at 1571, 1578; 4550 at 1988-89.) However, the undisputed 
testimony was that such tax impacts were not a consideration during this process, (R 
4550 at 1989), and that such a sale probably would not have resulted in the mentioned tax 
consequences, (R 4550 at 2021). 
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arrangements or a sale to pay off the Chemical Bank loan. (R 4546 at 1243; 4548 at 1599-
1600, 1613-15; 4550 at 1932-33; D-51, D-322, D-314). Cushman & Wakefield presented 
the Mall to over fifty national lenders and potential buyers through 1992. (R 4548 at 1601, 
1604-05, 1622; D-51; D-322; D-337 (written summary of efforts).) However, by this time, 
the national permanent financing and real estate markets had virtually "collapsed,"11 
(R 4541 at 530; 4545 at 1049-50, 1066-68, 1076, 1174-75; 4546 at 1275-76; 4548 at 1599-
1600, 1635; 4555 at 1891-93), and coupled with certain cash flow limitations on the Mall, 
all of the efforts to finance or sell the Mall were unsuccessful,12 (R 4548 at 1595-99; D-322, 
D-337). The Smiths did not criticize the reasonableness or effectiveness of the specific 
efforts made by Fairfax to refinance or sell the Mall. 
Fairfax sought and successfully arranged five short-term extensions of the Chemical 
Bank loan from 1991 to July 1993 to permit it to seek other financing or a buyer—the 
As part of this process, the Partnerships had the Mall appraised in mid-1992 at $15 
million. (R 4543 at 662.) 
11
 Smith testified that the New Mexico real estate market did not experience a downturn 
at that time, (R 4519 at 428-29), and the Smiths' expert testified that the market was 
"showing signs of doing well; not great, but well," (R 4542 at 632). The precise 
characterization of the New Mexico market at that time is not critical because of Fairfax's 
actual unsuccessful attempts to refinance or sell the Mall in that market. (D-337 
(identifying efforts directed at regional lenders/buyers).) 
1 9 
Andrew Oliver of Cushman & Wakefield testified that only one institutional lender 
(Allstate) actively considered refinancing and even this was only at $9 million; 
furthermore, Allstate's formal offer dropped to $6 million. (R 4548 at 1604; D-339.) In 
August 1992, Mr. Oliver wrote to Fairfax that, although his efforts were continuing, "it 
would be very difficult to obtain a mortgage with a loan amount exceeding $9 million." 
(D-337.) By December 1992 he had "exhausted all the avenues and there was basically 
no one interested in buying the property or in arranging financing." (R 4548 at 1603-04.) 
Mr. Oliver testified that the situation did not improve until after 1994 (more than a year 
after the REIT transaction). (R 4548 at 1604-05.) 
7 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
conditions for each succeeding extension, however, becoming increasingly burdensome. 
(R 4550 at 1913-15; D-356; see also R 4545 at 1065-66.) Upon expiration of the fifth 
extension in July 1993, Chemical Bank served a notice of default and demanded payment in 
full of the $11.3 million loan balance. (R 4545 at 1106-07; D-354.) In September 1993, 
Fairfax was able to negotiate a sixth and final extension (through July 15, 1994) on the basis 
that it was working to organize a REIT to pay off the loan. (R 4545 at 1175.) But for the 
prospect of conveying the Mall to the REIT, the sixth extension would not have been 
granted. (R 4545 at 1075.) Most importantly, Chemical Bank told Fairfax that there were 
to be no further extensions.13 (R 4545 at 1069-70,1073.) 
Unable to refinance or sell the Mall and unable to pay the Chemical Bank loan, the 
Partnerships faced imminent foreclosure or bankruptcy. (R 4545 at 1089, 1107; 4548 at 
1719-20; 4550 at 1914,1922-23.) The Smiths presented no evidence that they could have 
gotten fair market value (or any return on investment) for the Mall in foreclosure or 
bankruptcy. However, Fairfax established that foreclosure or bankruptcy would have had 
the following serious adverse consequences to all of the partners, including the Smiths: 
(1) the partners' investment in the Mall would be lost, (R 4542 at 613-14; 4545 at 1088; 
13
 Thomas Matesich of Chemical Bank testified that in light of the fact that the permanent 
financing market had "evaporated" and the bank's July 1991 merger with another bank 
having a large real estate portfolio, Chemical Bank had issued "strict mandates to reduce 
our portfolio as quickly and efficiently as possible without suffering significant losses," 
that the bank's "strategy was not necessarily to work with borrowers but to try to get 
them off the books," and that the bank was "not of the mind-set to extend maturities 
beyond a certain point in time if we thought. . . there was an opportunity for borrowers to 
either dispose of the asset or repay the obligation through other financial means." (R 
4548 at 1635-37, 1639, 1643.) 
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4548 at 1719-24); (2) the partners would incur depreciation recapture tax liability, (R 4545 
at 1088, 1132); and (3) the partners, including Smith, could incur liability on their personal 
guarantees of the Chemical Bank loan, (R 4541 at 435). Faced with this dire situation and 
believing it had no other alternatives, Fairfax pursued the only course then available— 
inclusion of the Mall in a REIT then being considered by Fairfax for other Fairfax 
properties14 (due to recent changes in the law). (R 4545 at 1082, 1089, 1097; 4546 at 1235; 
4550 at 1923, 1986.) 
4. Preparation of the REIT Transaction. Fairfax hired nationally recognized 
attorneys and brokers to advise it with respect to creating the REIT. (R 4541 at 507, 606; 
4545 at 1092, 1094, 1097-99; 4546 at 1291-94, 1301.) The goal of Fairfax and its 
professional advisors was to obtain the highest values available for the properties 
contributed to the REIT, including the Mall. (R 4541 at 606; 4545 at 1083-87, 1100-01; 
4546 at 1231, 1328-29.) Although the Smiths objected to not using appraisals for the REIT 
The Smiths repeatedly pointed to the benefits that Price and/or Fairfax received from 
the REIT due to their ownership of other properties as evidence of alleged "self-dealing," 
and the Smiths argued that Fairfax did not disclose facts to the Smiths because it "did not 
want the Smiths to interfere by filing an adverse claim or potential lawsuit when the 
REIT was created." (R 4551 at 2056.) Such arguments are unfounded because it was 
undisputed at trial that Fairfax could have gone ahead with the REIT for these other 
properties without the Mall—although to the detriment of the Partnerships. (See R 4545 
at 1123; 4550 at 1921-22.) It was also undisputed that although Price personally 
benefited from the REIT, (P-71 at 8-9 (Prospectus); R 4542 at 615-18), he would have 
received those same benefits (or even more) from the REIT if the Mall had not been 
contributed to the REIT. (R 4545 at 1117-18, 1123-24, 1129-36; 4546 at 1288-90, 1327-
28; 4550 at 1921-22, 1949-50, 1958-61, 1948.) Consequently, there can be no argument 
that Fairfax contributed the Mall to the REIT to obtain any personal benefit, but Fairfax 
acted only to benefit the Partnerships. 
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valuation,I5 (R 4540 at 288-90, 343, 363), Fairfax relied on the advice of the professionals 
that such values should be determined by a uniform method acceptable to investors and 
typically used for REIT transactions, rather than individualized real estate appraisals, which 
tend to vary from appraiser to appraiser. (R 4545 at 1094-94, 1099,1127-28, 1150-52, 
1163-64; 4546 at 1291-96.) 
In a July 19, 1993 telephone conversation, Fairfax representatives discussed with 
Smith their efforts "to secure additional financing to replace the Chemical Bank loan," the 
"difficulty in refinancing all of [Fairfax's malls], not just [the Mall]," and that Fairfax was 
considering the possibility of creating a REIT, of which the Mall would be a small part. 
(R 4540 at 263-71, 476,486, 487; 4545 at 1083-84; P-57 (Smith's notes).) Smith 
expressed concern about what would happen to his interest in such a transaction. (R 4540 at 
265.) According to Smith, he was told by Fairfax that he had three "options": (1) "buy out 
1:>
 The use of the REIT method of valuation was the Smiths' main point of dispute. 
Although both appraisers and REIT valuators start with capitalized net operating income, 
a REIT valuation requires a further deduction of the costs of the REIT from the Mall's 
operating income. The Smiths' damage expert, Merrill Norman, succinctly summarized 
his objections to the REIT accounting as follows: "[W]e should be valuing this property 
irrespective of how it gets financed in the future. . . . The fallacy of this method is that 
this method tries to measure some type of value, REIT value, after the REIT is put in 
place. And many of these costs here didn't exist before the REIT was established. They 
are either in conjunction with the establishment of the REIT, or . . . with the new debt 
associated with refinancing through the REIT. . . . But the fair approach is to value this 
without regard to what might happen to the REIT and back up in time to come up with 
fair market value before the REIT expenses are treated at all. . . . I'm not trying to be a 
lawyer, counsel. But I understand the measure's fair market value as the parties find 
themselves. . . . We need not get into the REIT as an alternative solution." (R. 4543 at 
780; 4544 at 467, 973, 975.) Although Norman considered value "as the parties find 
themselves," he attributed no cost or other negative effect on value resulting from 
Chemical Bank's notice of default. 
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my interest" based on a formula, (2) "contribute [Fairfax's] 85 percent... to the REIT and 
you would be a partner with the REIT," or (3) "contribute the entire property and . . . give 
you stock in the REIT." (R 4540 at 269-71; P-57.) Although there was a dispute over what 
Fairfax representatives said to Smith, (R 4540 at 476-77; 4545 at 1078-79), it is undisputed 
that in the end the Smiths were not given the three options because the entire Mall propeity 
had to be transferred to the REIT in order to pay the Chemical Bank loan. (R 4545 at 1107-
08; 4550 at 1920-21.) 
In September 1993, Fairfax continued preparation for a REIT transaction. Fairfax 
formed JP Realty, Inc., a Maryland corporation, which would be the "trust1' entity, and Price 
Development Company, a Maryland limited partnership, of which JP Really was the general 
partner, which would hold the properties. (R 4541 at 497-98; see also P-58; P-163 at 3.) 
A Contribution Agreement, by which the Mall woi-ld be transferred to the REIT at 
the time of and conditioned upon the REIT's closing, was also signed by Fairfax on 
September 13, 1993, in anticipation of the REIT.16 (P-58, 59.) At trial, the Smiths 
complained that the Contribution Agreement should have been disclosed to the Smiths, and 
such nondisclosure was used by the Trial Court to justify the award of punitive damages in 
this case. (R 4840 at 281, 285, 300, 361; 4494-95.) However, it was undisputed that 
Fairfax relied en the advice of counsel that the securities laws precluded it from making an 
earlier disclosure to the Smiths. (R 454J at 507, 521; 4545 at 1103-04; 4546 at 1233; 4550 
at 1920, 1994-97.) 
16
 A "preliminary prospectus" for the REIT at $22.50 per share was filed with the SEC on 
or about September 15, 1993. (P-163.) However, that sale failed to close. 
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In October 1993, Smith agreed (allegedly at Fairfax's request) to transfer the 
Partnership interests held in trust for his children to himself "because of some technicality" 
relative to the REIT transaction. (R 4540 at 278; 4541 at 431-32.) 
In approximately November 1993, Fairfax called Smith to provide "an update" and 
to see if Smith "thought much about what they talked about in connection with the REIT."17 
(R 4540 at 277-78.) On November 17, 1993, Smith wrote to Fairfax requesting information 
that he needed to "make a decision on your question concerning the contribution of 
partnership interest to the REIT." (P-62; R 4540 at 275.) Smith wanted information 
regarding the "value of my equity interest" and whether his "loan to the partnership [will] be 
paid" with interest, and further whether "other partnership loans have been periodically 
paid" while he had received no payments. (P-62.) On November 22, 1993, Fairfax told 
Smith that it was "still working on some of the valuation issues," and would call Smith to 
"go over the questions you ask in your letter." (D-366.) 
On December 1, 1993, Fairfax and Smith again talked by telephone. Fairfax then 
faxed to Smith "an estimate," dated November 29, 1993, showing an "Estimated Total 
Partnership Units" of 9,628. (P-64; R 4540 at 286-88.) On December 2, 1993, Fairfax sent 
to Smith audited financial statements for the Partnerships, which "whether right or wrong" 
showed the capital calls as "capital contributions," and further explained Fairfax's 
17
 Amended preliminary prospectuses for a REIT at $22.00 per share were filed with the 
SEC on November 15 and 18, 1993. (P-164 and 165.) A further amended preliminary 
prospectus at $19.00 per share was filed on November 30, 1993. (P-166.) These sales 
failed to close at these prices. 
12 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
subsequent gap loans to finance operating deficits. (P-65.) That letter also outlined 
Fairfax's unsuccessful attempts to refinance or sell the Mall: 
As you may be aware, we have tried several different approaches to refinance or sell 
the property. To date we have not found an acceptable buyer willing to pay a 
reasonable price for the property or a lender that would loan sufficient funds that 
would not require at least an additional infusion of cash ($3.0 to $4.0 million) to pay 
off the existing mortgage. None of these options would be acceptable to either one 
of us. These facts are what piompted my conversation with you some lime ago as to 
whether you might have a group of investors who might be willing to purchase the 
property. . . . We feel we still have significant financial exposure relative to this 
property. Though we have not seen the increase in value that we would have liked, 
we feel the REIT eliminates the potential future exposure with respect to the 
property. 
(P-65.) On that same evening, Smith called Fairfax and complained that the "estimate" was 
not based on "fair market value," and that the estimate showed repayment of an 
"intercompany loan" to Fairfax but not to Smith. (R 4540 at 288-98; P-66 (Smith's notes).) 
Smith also raised other concerns, such as the fairness of allocating REIT costs to the 
Partnerships when part of the REIT funds were to be used to buy out Price's partners in the 
Cottonwood Mall. (Id.) Smith claims that he also asked about "what happened to the 
[three] options," but that all Fairfax "would talk about [was] their valuation and the number 
of units that they thought that I was entitled to in the REIT." (R 4540 at 299.) Smith's other 
December attempts to get information were allegedly unsuccessful. (R 4540 at 299-300.) 
In January 1994, Smith received the final Prospectus dated January 13, 1904, for the 
REIT by express delivery.18 (P-71; R 4540 at 298.) The Prospectus disclosed that the Mall 
Amended preliminary prospectuses at $18.25 per share were filed with the SEC on 
January 5 and 12, 1994. (P-168 and 169.) The final Prospectus at $17.50 per share was 
filed with the SEC on January 13, 1994. (P-71.) 
13 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
was to be contributed pursuant to agreement to the REIT, it described the formation of the 
REIT, and it disclosed Price's potential conflicts of interest19 in and benefits20 from the 
REIT. (P-71 at 2-3, 14-15,25-26,45, 63-64, 90.) Prior to this date, Smith had not been told 
about the existence of the Contribution Agreement. (R 4540 at 298-300.) On January 20, 
1994, (the day before the REIT closed), Fairfax told Smith that he would get 13,319 units 
from the REIT, (D-442; R4549 at 1843, see footnotes 24 and 25, for a calculation of this 
number), which at the Prospectus price represented a value of $233,882.50. 
Fairfax did not seek the Smiths' consent prior to closing the REIT.21 (R 4540 at 211-
18.) However, it was uncontested that the Smiths were not asked for their consent because 
In particular, the Prospectus disclosed that the contribution of the properties "was not 
based on arm's length negotiations between the [property owners] and [the REIT] or on 
independent appraisals or valuations of the Properties." (P-71 at 14; see also id. at 2, 26, 
63, 64.) However, as was explained by the only REIT expert to testify at trial, the REIT 
method of valuation "is dictated by capital markets" based on the "ability [of each 
property] to generate cash flow." (R 4546 at 1293.) There really are (and can be) no 
"negotiations" at the contribution stage, which is where the alleged conflict of interest 
between Price and the Smiths or self-dealing would have occurred, because that 
contribution is based on the objective criteria of net operating income. (R 4546 at 1336.) 
Based on the reported net operating incomes of the properties, the buying public then 
determines how much it is willing to pay for that stream of income, and the property 
owners determine whether to accept that price. (R 4546 at 1334-35.) Thus, a REIT is in 
essence "an arm's length negotiation dictated by market circumstances" between the 
property contributors (represented by Fairfax in this case) and the public investors 
(represented by the investment bankers). (R 4546 at 1334-35.) 
20
 The benefits outlined in the REIT prospectus included a release of his guarantees on 
debt from other contributed partnerships, the buy-out of his partners in the Cottonwood 
Mall, and the receipt of preferential voting rights. (P-71 at 8-9.) 
21
 The parties disputed Fairfax's right to enter the REIT under the partnership agreements 
without the Smiths' consent. Specifically, the parties disputed whether the contribution 
of the Mall to the REIT was a "partnership purpose" under section 7.2, which required 
the Smiths' consent before Fairfax could "assign specific Partnership property, for other 
than a Partnership purpose." (P-15 § 7.2.) The Smiths contended that, inasmuch as it 
14 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
New York counsel advised Fairfax that federal securities laws prevented such disclosure to 
the Smiths in this instance and that the partnership agreements did not require the Smiths' 
consent. (R 4541 at 502; 4545 at 1092-94, 1105, 1137-40; 4550 at 1997.) 
5. The REIT Closing 
The REIT closed on January 21, 1994, and was registered on the New York Stock 
Exchange.22 It was undisputed that the REIT generated as much income as was possible. 
(R 4546 at 1328.) Thirty-eight properties, including the Mall, from over seventy-five 
separate partnerships or entities, were contributed to the REIT in exchange for shares in the 
REIT.23 (R4545 at 1164,1226-27, 1232.) None of the other entities or partners ever 
was undisputed that the partners did not contemplate a REIT in 1984, but rather 
anticipated operating the Mall, (R 4539 at 154; 4542 at 578), the contribution of the Mall 
to the REIT could not be a partnership purpose and required their consent. (R 4540 at 
211-14.) Fairfax contended that the partnership agreements provided that the 
Partnerships' "purpose" included to "deal with" the property, which covers the sale of 
part or all of the property, and that the contribution of the Mall to the REIT to avoid 
foreclosure or bankruptcy would have been within the scope of that purpose, (P-15 art. 5; 
R 3782-87, 4265-262). 
99 
This offering closed only because Price unilaterally agreed, without effect on any of the 
other partners, to dilute his personal interest by several million dollars. (R 4545 at 1112-
13.) The REIT closing attracted approximately 250 record holders and 15,000-18,000 
individual investors. (R 4545 at 1095.) 
9^ 
The parties also disputed whether the contribution of the Mall to the REIT constituted a 
disposition or sale of "all of the interests in properties acquired by [the Partnerships] and 
other investments made by it," thereby causing the dissolution of the Partnerships and 
imposing on Fairfax the duty to "sell all of the Partnership assets as promptly as is 
consistent with obtaining the fair market value thereof." (P-15 at § 14 (emphasis added).) 
The Smiths argued that the Partnerships dissolved, thereby entitling them to the "fair 
market value" (as determined by their appraisers). Fairfax contended that the 
contribution of the Mall for shares in the REIT was not sale, but only a change from 
direct to indirect ownership of the Mall. Fairfax also argued that the REIT shares 
constituted "other investments" so that the Partnerships were not dissolved. In any event, 
Fairfax argued the Mall could not have been sold for appraised, fair market value prior to 
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complained about the REIT transaction, even though all were treated essentially the same as 
the Smiths. (R 4545 at 1232.) 
On or before the closing, the schedules to the Contribution Agreement were changed 
to reflect that the Partnerships had been allocated 20,793 REIT shares: 8,793 shares were 
allocated to the Partnerships by the underwriters using the standard REIT formula, and Price 
personally contributed an additional 12,000 shares to the Partnerships so as to resolve the 
Smiths' concerns.24 (P-58 at Ex. B; R 4550 at 1998-2001.) It is undisputed that the Mall 
was valued according to traditional REIT standards, except that the Mall's capitalization 
rate ("cap rate") used was decreased, thereby increasing the Mall's value in order to 
foreclosure or bankruptcy so that the REIT was the only viable alternative to salvage any 
value for the Mall. The Trial Court ruled that the partnership agreements were 
"ambiguous," (R 3706 (Instruction No. 31)), but then ruled and instructed the jury that 
"fair market value" was the only measure of damages, (R 3717 (Instruction No. 41), 3722 
(Instruction No. 46)), and that "the fair market value of the partnership property," 
defined to assume "a reasonable length of time for sale," "is the standard upon which to 
base the value of the Smiths' partnership interest in connection with the claims," (R 3723 
(Instruction No. 47)). These instructions severely undercut Fairfax's argument that the 
REIT (a valuation of the Mall under REIT standards) was the only viable alternative 
under the circumstances. 
24
 As is often the case where numbers are involved, the various allocations of REIT units 
in this case may become confusing. On December 2, 1993, Fairfax provided an 
"estimate" showing that the Partnerships would get 9,628 shares from the REIT, which 
would correspond to 1,444 shares for the Smiths' 15% interest. (P-64.) At the time of 
the closing of the REIT, the REIT methodology would have yielded 8,793 shares 
allocated to the Partnerships, and 1,319 shares ($23,082.50 value) to the Smiths. Both 
calculations used the same methodology, but resulted in different allocations due to 
intervening changes in costs from the delay due to the failed closings. The 20,793 
number actually given to the Partnerships comes from adding 8,973 (REIT value) and 
12,000 (Price contributions). The 13,319 number given to the Smiths in January is 
calculated by taking the Smiths' 15% share of the REIT valuation, then adding all (rather 
than 15%>) of Price's contribution of 12,000 shares. A chart reflecting these numbers is 
found in footnote 25. 
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demonstrate positive value and preserve the tax status of the Partnerships and their partners, 
including the Smiths. (R 4545 at 1111,1166-67,1288-90,1294-95.) The Chemical Bank 
loan was paid, and a portion of the new debt was allocated to the Partnerships to preserve or 
confer tax advantages, the benefit of which was given to the Smiths (and not to the other 
partners in the Partnerships). (R 4550 at 1937.) The undisputed testimony of the REIT 
expert who testified at trial established that the allocation to the Partnerships at closing was 
"very fair" and that Price went "overboard" to give benefit to the Smiths. (R 4546 at 1288-
90, 1328.) 
6. Post-Closing Discussions and Settlement Offers Between Smith and Fairfax. 
Following the closing of the REIT on January 21, 1994, Smith continued his objections to 
the REIT valuation and to the Partnership accounting issues. (R 4540 at 297; 4550 at 1939-
41,2006;P-80,81,82;D-401.) 
In a letter to Smith dated March 8, 1994, Fairfax offered Smith two proposals. (P-
82.) (A copy of this letter is included in the Addendum at lab I.) Under the first proposal, 
Fairfax offered the Smiths 1,319 units, reflecting their 15% share of the January 1994 
computation (8,793), plus 13,179 additional units (from Price) for their capital call (without 
The Smiths argued that this letter was "an exhibit that [Fairfax] didn't want to see the 
light of day, but it is. This is like a piercing light. This document isn't going to go away. 
It is the smoking gun of this trial. Because after all of this . . . they send this letter to 
Armand Smith, and they say that the REIT units aren't 20,793. They say that there is an 
original computation . . . of 8,793 units for the whole partnership, of which you are 
entitled to 15 percent." (R 4551 at 2057.) The irony of the Smiths' argument is that this 
letter provided the Smiths with an even more advantageous allocation than under a strict 
REIT accounting. Fairfax objected to the introduction of this settlement offer under Utah 
Rule of Evidence 408, which objection was denied. 
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interest), which at $17.50 per unit represented a total value of $253,715. (R 4545 at 1237-
39, 2000-01.) This offer was 1,178 units (or $20,000) better than what he had been told his 
allocation would be in January. Alternatively, Fairfax offered the Smiths the value 
equivalent to the January allocation, but largely in cash: cash of $230,640 for their capital 
contribution (without interest) plus 352 units for their 15% interest (worth an additional 
$6,160) based on a revised computation with "full accrual of interest on the partner loans'' 
to preserve Smith's tax position.26 (R 4550 at 1938.) 
26
 The following table tracks the allocations (actual and theoretical) from December 1993 
through trial: 
Date 
12/1/93 
estimate 
(P-64) 
1/20-21/94 
closing 
(P-58, D-
442) 
3/8/941)1 
offer 
(P-82) 
3/8/94H2 
offer 
(P-82) 
2000 
Discovery 
* Denote* 
P-ship 
Units Per 
REIT 
Method 
9,628* 
8,793 
8,793* 
2,348* 
20,793*** 
> the infoi 
P-ship 
Actual 
Units 
20,739 
20,793 
20,793 
20,793* 
mation a 
Smiths' 15% 
Share Per 
REIT Method 
1,444** 
1,319 
($23,082) 
1,319* 
($23,082) 
352* 
($6,160) 
3,119** 
($54,582) 
ictually disc 
Smiths' 15% 
Share of 
Actual Units 
3,119 
($54,582) 
3,119 
($54,582) 
3,119 
($54,582) 
3,119** 
($54,582) 
osed to the 
What the 
Smiths Were 
Told 
1,444** 
13,319* 
($233,082) 
14,498* 
($253,715) 
352 plus 
$230,640 cash* 
($236,800) 
N/A 
Smiths at thai 
Reason for Difference m the Smiths' 
Allocation 
All numbers based on REIT 
methodology 
Price's 12,000 shares would have 
been added to the Smiths' REIT 
units under this calculation 
13,179 shares would have been 
added to the Smiths' REIT units, 
\v hich was the value of their capital 
call without interest - shares would 
have come from Price's 12,000 
contribution and 1,178 shares from 
Price and/or Price-related partners 
New REIT calculation results from 
change in intercompany loan 
balance (1 e , "full accrual of 
interest"), and the Smiths' capital 
call without interest would have 
been paid in cash 
Same number as 1/21 /94 
t time. 
** Denotes information that the Smiths could have calculated by multiplying the 
Partnership units by 15%. 
*** Fairfax lowered the capitalization rate on the 2000 calculation so as to reach the 
20,793 (inclusive of Price's contribution) under the REIT method. 
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In April 1994, the parties met in Salt Lake City. Smith claims that when he asked 
"about the other options," he was told for the first time that the Mall had already been 
contributed to the REIT even though he had received copies of the Prospectus. (R 4541 at 
359-60.) When Smith asked why he had not been given earlier notice, Fairfax allegedly 
told him that "due to the size and significance of this transaction, they chose to ignore [his] 
interest." (R 4541 at 360.) After that meeting, a copy of the Contribution Agreement was 
provided to Smith. (P-90; R 4551 at 361-62.) 
7. Litigation. Smith then retained counsel in June 1994 to bring this lawsuit. 
(R 4551 at 364.) During litigation, Fairfax produced a chart reflecting the allocation to the 
Partnerships of 20,793 REIT units.27 (R 4550 at 1979; D-449.) 
At trial, the Smiths pointed to partnership records showing that Fairfax had charged a 
5% management fee for the partnership, instead of the correct 3.9%, (R 4546 at 1200-02), 
but they presented no evidence of the amount of any overcharge or other claim of injury. 
The Smiths also put on evidence that Fairfax combined the Partnerships' banking account 
with the accounts of other Fairfax properties contrary to the Partnership agreements. 
However, the Smiths did not dispute Fairfax's evidence that (1) this was done in order to 
obtain greater earnings on the funds and for administrative efficiency, and (2) Smith had 
known about this practice since 1990 without raising an objection. (R 4540 at 224-25; 4541 
at 418-19.) The Smiths put on no evidence of any injury from combining of the accounts. 
Prior to closing argument, the Smiths represented that in the event of a favorable 
judgment, they would relinquish any ownership claim to the REIT shares. (R 4551 at 
2041.) 
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The Smiths did present evidence of damage, through their damages expert, Merrill 
Norman, who relied on the appraisal of the Mall by John Howden, to calculate damages. 
(R. 4544, p. 948.) Norman testified that if the Mall had been sold at fair market value 
without the REIT (ignoring the imminent foreclosure), the proceeds of that sale would have 
benefited the Smiths as follows: (1) repayment of their capital call ($228,390) with interest, 
(2) repayment of their capital contribution of certain water rights ($30,000), and (3) fifteen 
percent of the remaining proceeds as repayment of the balance of their capital ownership 
interest ($149,004). (P-173A; R. 4543 at 805-12; 4544 at 860-66.) The total of these 
figures (without interest) is $407,394. Mr. Norman's damage calculation was set forth in 
Exhibit 173, a copy of which is included at Tab K of the Addendum. Mr. Norman then 
presented evidence by way of calculations of compound prejudgment interest as follows: 
(1) $443,023 of interest on the $228,390 capital contribution (lines 13 and 15) since 1990, 
and (2) $154,198 in prejudgment interest on value of the Smiths' 15% remaining equity 
9Q 
interest (line 10a), for a total prejudgment interest claim of $597,221.00. The Smiths 
presented no other evidence of compensatory damages, including no showing of what 
The water rights were contributed for "an increase in [the Smiths'] capital account." 
(P-47.) Under the unambiguous terms of the Partnership agreements, such contributions 
do not accrue interest. (P-15 at T| 4.) Initially, the Trial Court ruled that no interest would 
accrue on the value of that contribution. (R 4543 at 830.) At the time of the jury 
instructions, however, the Trial Court erroneously reversed itself, allowing the jury to 
treat such rights as either "equity" or a "loan," presumably because of inconsistent 
treatment of that contribution in partnership records. (R 3725.) 
The Trial Court also allowed the Smiths to submit evidence of their expert witness 
expenses ($60,091) as part of their damages. (R 4544 at 871-74.) Norman also 
submitted a damage model assuming that the Smiths' capital calls were contributions to 
the capital accounts that did not bear interest, yielding a damage figure of $478,961 as of 
January 1, 1994, together with interest thereafter of $495,655. (R 4544 at 876-79.) 
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would have been received in foreclosure, bankruptcy, or from any other alternative to the 
REIT. (R 4544 at 917,934-35, 943, 974, 979-80.) 
After trial, the jury returned a special verdict finding that Fairfax had breached the 
partnership agreements, breached its fiduciary duty, and converted property belonging to the 
Smiths. A copy of the Judgment on Special Verdicts of the Jury for Compensatory and 
Punitive Damages ("Judgment") is included at Tab A of the Addendum. The jury awarded 
damages to the Smiths on all three theories of liability of "$410,000 (not including the time 
value of money or 'interest')"30 and "Damages due to time value of money or 'interest'" on 
the breach of fiduciary duty claim of $690,000, which latter amount is $92,000 more than 
the prejudgment interest evidence presented by the Smiths' damages expert. Id. The jury 
awarded punitive damages of $5,500,000 against Fairfax on the breach of fiduciary duty 
claim. Id.31 
8. Post-Trial Motions. The Trial Court denied Fairfax's posMrial motions and 
entered the Judgment and also Special Findings of the Court on Punitive Damage Verdict of 
the Jury (the "Special Findings"), a copy of which is included at Tab B of the Addendum. 
(R 4493-97.) The Special Findings were drafted by the Smiths' counsel and expand on the 
Trial Court's own Minute Entry. The Special Findings thus constitute a marshalling by the 
Smiths of their punitive damages evidence.32 The Special Findings provide: 
This number necessarily included some amount for expert witness fees. 
•3 1 
The Trial Court also awarded attorney fees to Smiths in an amount of $517,611.40 and 
costs of $7,133.26. (R4505.) 
The Smiths had proposed a finding that "in the partnership accountings of 1992 and 
1993, partnership tax deductions and partnership phantom income were wrongfully, 
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The jury could have found by clear and convincing evidence a pattern of 
deceit, failure to disclose and misrepresentation with respect to the three 
"options" which Price Development personnel discussed with Armand Smith 
relative to formation by Price Development of a real estate investment trust. 
To that end, there was substantial evidence: 
-that Price Development failed to disclose to the Smiths that the 
Contribution Agreements were executed by Price Development in late 
September or October 1993, in which Price Development agreed to 
convey the North Plains Mall Property to another Price entity, Price 
Development Company, a Maryland limited partnership, for the 
benefit of the JP Realty REIT; 
-that said disclosure should have been made during the month of 
September, October or November, 1993, but was not made even in 
early December 1993 when Price Development submitted to Smiths a 
"preliminary estimate" of the "REIT value" of the North Plains Mall; 
-that the Contribution Agreement was not disclosed to the Smiths by 
Price Development until April 1994, nearly three months after the 
formation of the JP Realty REIT; 
-that Price Development did not disclose to Smiths until March 1994 
that they no longer had options with respect to their 15% interest of the 
North Plains Mall being kept out of the REIT, or such interest being 
purchased at the fair market value thereof; 
-that the letter of March 8, 1994 setting forth "an original 
computation" and a "revised computation" of the Smiths' interest in 
the allocated REIT value of the North Plains Mall was false, 
misleading and deceitful; 
-that Price Development Company did not want the Smiths to interfere 
by filing an adverse claim or potential lawsuit prior to January 21, 
1994 when the J.P. Realty REIT was created, established and 
implemented; 
unfairly and improperly allocated," but the Court deleted that finding. (R 4510.) 
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-that the March 8, 1994 "revised calculation" of 312 units was 
intentionally misleading and was in wanton disregard of the 
partnership rights of the Smiths in the North Plains Mall Property; 
-that Price Development Company never made an accurate accounting 
to the Smiths as to Price Development's own calculation of the "REIT 
value" of the Smiths' interest until the year 2000, after nearly six years 
of litigation brought by Smiths to obtain an accounting and relief for 
breach of fiduciary duty; 
-Price Development paid itself, as general partner, excessive fees 
beyond that clearly set forth in the Partnership Agreements; 
-Price Development failed to maintain a separate bank account for the 
North Plains Mall Partnerships, co-mingling all funds from all Price 
owned properties and making it difficult to isolate and allocate 
revenues, costs, expenses and net income of the North Plains Mall 
Property; 
-that Price Development accrued to itself interest on monies it 
advanced to the Partnerships, which it referred to as capital call 
contributions, but did not pay or accrue to the Smiths' interest on their 
proportionate capital call contributions; 
-that the Smiths were never advised by Price Development, as general 
partner, of the potential conflicts which it and the Price principals had 
with respect to the conveyance of the North Plains Mall property from 
Price Development Company to Price Development Company, a 
Maryland limited partnership, for the benefit of the JP Realty REIT; 
-that there was substantial evidence upon which the jury could have 
found that the conduct of Price Development Company in this case 
was intentional and in wanton disregard of the rights of the Smiths; 
-that the wealth of Price Development Company was reasonably in 
excess of $37,000,000 as of the end of December 1999. 
In neither the Minute Entry nor the Special Findings did the Trial Court provide a 
detailed and reasoned articulation of the grounds for concluding that the punitive damage 
award was not excessive in light of the Crookston I and due process factors. Nor did the 
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Trial Court make any findings that the conduct described in the Findings caused any injury 
to the Smiths. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
On the issue of liability, the Trial Court allowed the Smiths to proceed at trial on the 
theory that the Partnerships could have obtained the fair market, appraised value of the Mall 
but for the REIT. However, the evidence at trial was insufficient—indeed there was no 
evidence—to demonstrate that but for the Partnerships' participation in the REIT (or other 
alleged breaches), the Smiths would have obtained the value they allege. Consequently, the 
Trial Court erred in denying Fairfax's motion for summary judgment, motion in limine, 
motion for directed verdict, and motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on this 
issue. 
In addition, the issue of punitive damages should not have been submitted to the jury. 
Given the undisputed facts that Fairfax was attempting to save the Mall through the REIT 
transaction, that there was no other alternative to foreclosure or bankruptcy, and that Fairfax 
had hired and relied upon professional advisors, there was insufficient evidence to establish 
malicious or recklessly indifferent conduct that injured the Smiths. 
Moreover, even if punitive damages were properly before the jury, this Court in 
conducting de novo review should eliminate or substantially reduce the amount of the $5.5 
million award pursuant to the Crookston I factors. In fact, this case is classically 
appropriate for eliminating or reducing punitive damages 
Finally, the Trial Court erred in submitting prejudgment interest to the jury and in 
allowing prejudgment interest on the Smiths' damages because all such damages depend on 
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a calculation of the Mall's fair market value. Alternatively, the Trial Court failed to correct 
the jury's award of $690,000, which was $92,000 higher than any evidence presented. 
ARGUMENT 
I. As a Matter of Law and Undisputed Fact, the Smiths Failed to Establish Any 
Injury Caused by the Partnerships' Contribution of the Mall to the REIT. 
The Smiths' damage theories depended on the assumption that the Mall would have 
been sold for "fair market value" if the property had remained on the market for a 
"reasonable time" or "one year" rather than being contributed to the REIT. (R 4543 at 
670-73, 4544 at 942-45, 973-76.) Fairfax argued before, during, and after trial that 
contribution of the Mall to the REIT was the only available alternative to foreclosure and 
bankruptcy, so that a "fair market" or appraisal-based valuation of the Mall was 
unsupported by the evidence. The Trial Court erred in denying Fairfax's motions on this 
point.34 
As is clear from Norman's testimony, the starting point for the calculation of damages 
was the receipt of proceeds from a fair market sale, which, after paying off the Chemical 
Bank loan, would be distributed to the partners. (R 4543 at 795-801; P-173; R 4544 at 
860-83, 948.) The characterization of capital contributions, capital calls, loans, and 
ownership interests, merely dictates the order in which such proceeds, if any, would be 
distributed. (See P-15 at §§ 12, 14.) However, if there were no net proceeds of a sale, 
then such characterizations would be immaterial. 
34
 If the REIT was the only available alternative, then the Smiths' claims would fail on 
several related grounds, in addition to the causation argument discussed above. First, on 
grounds closely related to causation, the Smiths would not have proved their damages 
with reasonable certainty. The Smiths' evidence of fair market value (what a willing 
buyer would pay to a willing seller not acting under duress) would not establish damages 
where there would not have been a willing buyer prior to a foreclosure or other duress 
sale. Second, under such circumstances the Smiths could not prove breach of fiduciary 
duty. The Trial Court apparently agreed: 
If the jury believe . . . and they were to conclude and agree that the [REIT] was the 
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In Utah, the "law of damages seeks to place the aggrieved party in the same 
economic position he would have had if the contract had been performed." Mahmood v. 
Ross, 1999 UT 104, f38; see also Ranch Homes, Inc. v. Greater Park City Corp., 592 P.2d 
620, 624 (Utah 1979) (contract claim); Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein & Fielding, 909 P.2d 1283, 
1290 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (fiduciary duty claim). Thus, in this case, the Smiths' would be 
entitled to only what they would have received if the Mall had not gone into the REIT. 
The Smiths had the burden of proving that they were damaged by Fairfax's conduct 
(i.e., participation in the REIT) and the amount of such damages "within a reasonable 
certainty." Mahmood, 1999 UT 104, f20. Although causation issues are generally for the 
jury, this Court has held that a trial court must grant a directed verdict on causation where 
the issue of the "proximate cause of the injury is left to conjecture": 
[A] jury is [not] free to find a causal connection between a breach and some 
subsequent injury by relying on unsupported speculation. Although juries may make 
deductions based on reasonable probabilities, "the evidence must do more than 
merely raise a conjecture or show a probability. Where there are probabilities the 
other way equally or more potent the deductions are mere guesses and the jury 
should not be permitted to speculate. The law is well established in this jurisdiction 
that where 'the proximate cause of the injury is left to conjecture, the plaintiff must 
fail as a matter of law.'" 
Id., T|22 (citations omitted; emphasis added). Thus, the Smiths had to establish a 
only option that John Price had available, there would be no breach of fiduciary 
duty. . . . The plaintiffs are not really claiming here that somehow [Fairfax] did 
the accounting wrong in a REIT context. What they are claiming is that they never 
should have put this in without the consent of the plaintiffs in the first place. 
(R 4546 at 1198.) Third, the Smiths could not establish a breach of contract because, as a 
matter of law, a sale to the REIT to avoid foreclosure wold constitute a "partnership 
purpose" under section 7.6 of the partnership agreements so that the Smiths' consent to 
the REIT would not have been required. (See R 4538 at 86-89.) 
26 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
"reasonable probability]" that the Partnerships could have obtained the fair market value of 
the Mall without the REIT. But if the evidence indicated that there were "probabilities . . . 
equally or more potent" that the REIT was the only way to avoid foreclosure and 
bankruptcy, then the issue of proximate causation was "conjecture," and the Smiths' claims 
fail as a matter of law. 
The evidence at trial was uncontroverted that the REIT was the only way to avoid 
foreclosure. By late 1993 and early 1994, the Partnerships faced imminent foreclosure or 
bankruptcy. Consequently, the Partnerships could not wait any longer for a buyer to offer 
"fair market value" for the Mall. The Partnerships had unsuccessfully tried to sell the Mall 
or obtain permanent financing over a period of four years through both in-house efforts and 
the engagement of two separate national brokers, who had presented the Mall to over fifty 
national lenders and potential buyers. Although Fairfax had arranged five short-term 
extensions of the Chemical Bank loan between June 1991 and July 1993 for the purpose of 
finding other financing or buyers, by July 1993, Chemical Bank served a notice of default, 
demanded payment of the full loan balance, and agreed to grant only one more extension to 
allow the Partnerships to complete the REIT. Thus, the evidence established that the 
Partnerships were faced with imminent foreclosure or bankruptcy. The Smiths presented no 
evidence that the fair market value of the Mall could have been obtained in foreclosure or 
bankruptcy; rather, the only evidence in the record was that the Smiths would have lost their 
partnership interests and suffered other serious adverse consequences. 
The testimony of the Smiths' experts that they believed that the Mall could have 
been sold for full fair market value (before foreclosure) was on its face unsupported 
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speculation. Howden (the Smiths' appraiser) testified that he believed that a buyer or 
financing source could have been obtained within a year. (R 4543 at 673.) However, he 
conceded at trial that he did not know that Fairfax's had unsuccessfully tried to sell or 
refinance the Mall for five years. (R 4543 at 170-72.) Likewise, Norman testified that he 
believed that the Mall could have been sold prior to foreclosure based on the assumption 
that Chemical Bank would have offered another extension. (R 4544 at 942-45, 973-77.) 
However, Norman conceded that he never "conducted any analysis" of his own as to how 
long it would take to sell the property, was unaware that prior attempts had been made to 
sell the Mall, and was personally unaware of "whether Chemical Bank had reached the 
point where it refused to grant any more extensions." (R 4544 at 942-45, 973-77.) Because 
the undisputed evidence was that Chemical Bank had informed Fairfax that no further 
extensions would be granted and that Fairfax had already made exhaustive efforts to find a 
lender or buyer, the testimony of the Smiths' experts amounts to nothing more than 
"conjecture" and is therefore insufficient as a matter of law to establish damages in this 
case. Mahmood, 1999 UT 104, [^22. 
The Smiths never sought to calculate damages based on a theory that they should 
have received more units from the REIT or what they might have received through 
foreclosure or bankruptcy. Thus, the Smiths have advanced no evidence that they would 
have received any recovery of their loans to or investment in the Partnership outside of the 
REIT. This Court should therefore reverse the Trial Court's denial of Fairfax's motions for 
judgment, and remand for entry of judgment in favor of Fairfax on all claims. 
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II. The Trial Court Committed Reversible Error In Submitting the Issue of 
Punitive Damages to the Jury In the Absence of Evidence of Willful, 
Deliberate, or Reckless Disregard of the Rights of Plaintiffs Proximately 
Causing Injury, and Where Fairfax Took the Only Alternative Available 
to Save the Property from a Total Loss. 
The Trial Court denied Fairfax's motions for directed verdict, judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict, and/or new trial for insufficient evidence to support an award of 
any punitive damages. (R 3738-3811; 4157-4262; 4545 at 1002-05,1014; 4551 at 2034-
35.) In so doing, the Trial Court erred because, as a matter of law, even marshalling the 
punitive damages evidence presented by the Smiths, there was insufficient evidence to 
allow the issue of punitive damages to go to the jury. 
Under Utah law, punitives are allowed only where there is "willful and malicious 
conduct,... o r . . . conduct which manifests a knowing and reckless indifference toward, 
and disregard of, the rights of others." Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hosp., 675 P.2d 1179, 1186 
(Utah 1983). In Behrens, this Court stated that "punitive damages may be awarded only in 
exceptional cases," "should be awarded infrequently," and "must, if awarded, serve a 
societal interest of punishing and deterring outrageous and malicious conduct which is not 
likely to be deterred by other means." Id. 
Punitive damages should not have been considered in this case. First, in evaluating 
liability for punitive damages, a good faith reliance on advice of counsel militates against a 
finding of maliciousness. 22 Am. Jur. 2d Damages, § 779; cf Calhoun v. Universal Credit 
Co., 146 P.2d 284, 288 (Utah 1944) (good faith or honest belief that conduct was lawful 
precludes punitive damages even if belief was mistaken). 
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Second, the conduct on which the Smiths rely for punitive damages had no causal 
relation or nexus to the actual damages claimed by the Smiths. With respect to the 
requirement of causation, this Court stated in Behrens: 
A defendant's conduct must be malicious or in reckless disregard for the 
rights of others, although actual intent to cause injury is not necessary. That 
is, the defendant must either know or should know "that such conduct would, 
in a high degree of probability, result in substantial harm to another" and the 
conduct must be "highly unreasonable conduct...." 
675 P.2d 1186-87 (emphasis added; citation omitted). In other words, the conduct 
supporting punitive damages should be the conduct proximately causing the underlying 
damages in the case. This Court's conclusion regarding causation is consistent with the 
general requirement that "[p]unitive damages are only available if the unlawful act 
warranting actual damages was of a wanton and malicious nature." See First Interstate 
Bank v. Interfund Corp., 924 F.2d 588, 596 (5th Cir. 3991) (emphasis added). 
In the present case, the Smiths' asserted injury and damage was the decision to 
convey the Mall to the REIT rather than holding out for the Mall's alleged fair market value 
through a sale. Even if this Court were to conclude that Fairfax was wrong in its judgment 
on those issues, there was no evidence at trial that those decisions and actions were 
malicious or in reckless disregard of the Smiths' rights. 
The following uncontroverted evidence contradicts any possible conclusion that 
Fairfax acted in disregard of the Smiths' rights: 
a. The Mall had been experiencing financial shortfalls for years, 
requiring not only a capital call to the partners but also an additional $1.5 million gap 
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loan to meet ongoing expenses. Fairfax obtained the $1.5 million loan on its own 
credit and provided those monies to the Mall. 
b. From 1989 through 1993, Fairfax made extensive but unsuccessful 
efforts, individually and through national real estate brokers, to find a permanent 
loan or a buyer for the Mall to pay off the $11.5 million Chemical Bank loan. 
Although Fairfax was able to have the loan extended on five occasions, in July 1993, 
Chemical Bank issued a notice of default and demanded payment in full and, 
subsequently, told Fairfax that it would grant no further extensions beyond July 
1994. 
c. In the face of the default notice and its inability to find financing or a 
buyer, Fairfax determined that the only alternatives available at the time were to 
allow the Mall go into foreclosure, to file for bankruptcy, or to sell the Mall to a 
REIT, the proceeds from which sale could be used to pay off the Chemical Bank 
loan. Fairfax ultimately concluded that the REIT alternative was the only way to 
save the Mall, provide some positive value for the partners, and avoid personal 
liability of the partners for tax recapture and deficiencies on the Chemical Bank loan. 
d. Fairfax used the services of Wall Street Brokerage houses specializing 
in REIT transactions, as well as attorneys specializing in REIT, real estate, and SEC 
matters in order to ensure that the REIT was properly organized and that the sale was 
for the maximum value obtainable. Fairfax relied on the advice of its counsel that it 
had the right under the Partnership agreements to sell the Mall to the REIT, and 
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counsel directed the manner in which this was accomplished, including what could 
be disclosed to the Smiths prior to closing. 
e. All partners in the seventy-five separate partnerships conveying the 
thirty-eight separate properties to the REIT were treated proportionately equally 
in the allocation of REIT units, except for certain favorable treatment given to the 
Smiths. In addition, Fairfax/Price accepted a significant dilution of their/his interests 
in order to enable the REIT to succeed. 
f. Other than the Smiths, no partner in this or in any other of the seventy-
five partnerships ever complained or made any claim about how their interests in the 
REIT were handled. 
This uncontroverted evidence demonstrates that Fairfax tried to act in what it believed to be 
the interest of the Partnerships and the Smiths. Even if Fairfax's decisions were different 
than those that the Smiths would have made, those decisions were made in good faith and in 
the context of a business dispute. 
Nevertheless, the Trial Court pointed to six facts allegedly supporting an award of 
punitive damages. First, the Smiths contend that Fairfax failed to disclose to the Smiths the 
REIT Contribution Agreement for the Mall until April 1994. However, it is undisputed that 
Fairfax was told by New York legal counsel that the securities laws precluded such 
disclosure prior to issuance of the prospectus. Likewise, Fairfax did not seek the Smiths' 
prior consent to the REIT based on New York counsel's interpretation of the Partnership 
agreements. Furthermore, as noted above, the Smiths put on no causation evidence of any 
damage from Fairfax's actions in this regard. 
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Second, the Smiths point to Fairfax's letter of March 8, 1994 (written two and one-
half months after completion of the REIT) as containing a "revised calculation" that was 
intentionally misleading. However, the Smiths were simply not injured in any way by that 
post-closing letter. More importantly, even if Fairfax could be criticized for the way in 
which it presented its proposals, it is undisputed that the letter represented an attempt by 
Fairfax to augment the Smiths' recovery (at Fairfax's expense) beyond what other partners 
and partnerships had received from the REIT to resolve the Smiths' objections. 
Third, the Smiths presented evidence that Fairfax did not provide Smith an accurate 
accounting of the number of shares (20,793) allocated to the Partnerships until the year 
2000. However, it is undisputed that Fairfax disclosed to Smith in January and March 1994 
his personal allocations that were much more valuable than merely calculating his 15% 
share of the Partnerships' units. Moreover, the "late accounting" did not change the Smiths' 
actual position and the Smiths pointed to no injury from the delay in receiving updated, 
accurate accounting. 
Fourth, the Smiths presented evidence that Fairfax charged a 5% management fee 
rather than the 3.9% fee provided for in the partnership agreements. Even if this is true, the 
Smiths presented no evidence on whether the error was intentional or negligent, and no 
evidence as to the amount of any actual overcharge. 
Fifth, the Smiths put on evidence that Fairfax combined the Partnerships' bank 
account with the accounts of other partnerships, contrary to the terms of the partnership 
agreements. Fairfax representatives testified this was done to earn a higher return and for 
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administrative efficiency, and the Smiths put on no evidence of actual loss therefrom. 
Furthermore, Smith knew of the combined account since 1990 but raised no objections. 
Finally, the Smiths argued that Fairfax failed to advise them of Fairfax's potential 
conflicts in the REIT transaction, although Fairfax allegedly disclosed the conflict to the 
market in the Prospectus. Yet, the Smiths were in fact provided with a copy of the 
Prospectus by special delivery as soon as released to the public. Also, Smith learned from 
Fairfax the substance of the alleged conflicts during their 1993 discussions (such as the 
valuation of the properties on a non-appraisal basis, payment by the REIT of debt 
guaranteed by Price on other properties, the buy-out by the REIT of Price's co-partners in 
the Cottonwood Mall, etc.). Further, the "potential" conflicts were at most just that—the 
nature of the REIT valuation process and the oversight of the transaction by lawyers, 
bankers, and REIT experts protected against any detriment to the Smiths from such 
"conflicts." Finally, there was no evidence that Fairfax at any time treated the Smiths' 
interests proportionately differently than the other partners in the Partnerships or the 
partners in any other partnership involved in the REIT (except when Fairfax sought to 
improve the Smiths' position. 
Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the Smiths, it nevertheless fails 
to provide a basis for punitive damages. There is simply no evidence that any statement or 
failure on the part of Fairfax caused the Smiths to take action or to forego action to their 
detriment, or that any of Fairfax's actions caused injury to the Smiths. 
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For these reasons, the evidence was insufficient to support a punitive damages 
verdict and the case should be remanded for entry of judgment notwithstanding the verdict 
on punitive damages. 
III. A De Novo Review of the Punitive Damages Award Shows That, Under 
the Crookston I and Due Process Factors, the Award Is Excessive and 
Should Be Reduced. 
Fairfax's Motion for a New Trial on the question of punitive damages raised the 
issue "whether the amount of punitives is excessive or inadequate, appearing to have been 
given under the influence of passion or prejudice." Crookston I, 817 P.2d at 807. As 
discussed below, the Trial Court committed error by failing to make a detailed finding on 
whether the punitive damages award was excessive in light of the Crookston I standards. 
More importantly, de novo review by this Court will show that, if punitive damages are 
warranted at all, they should be substantially less than this Court's 3:1 ratio guideline for 
compensatory damages (prior to prejudgment interest). 
A. The Trial Court's Failure of Necessary Review. 
The punitive damages award in this case had a ratio to compensatory damages of at 
least 5:1 (and actually as high as more than 13:1). (See section C(vii) below.) When a 
punitive damages award exceeds a 3:1 ratio, "[t]he presumption . . . is that the award is 
excessive." Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 860 P.2d 937, 940 (Utah 1993) ("Crookston II"). 
"However,... this presumption may be overcome if the trial court explains why the case is 
unique in terms of one of the traditional seven factors or in terms of some other compelling 
factor." Id. The Trial Court made no such explanation here. Its failure to do so was plain 
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error. In light of this Court's adoption of a de novo standard of review, that failure by the 
Trial Court should be corrected by this Court. 
B. De Novo Review by This Court. 
This Court has adopted "the de novo standard for reviewing jury and trial court 
conclusions under the Crookston I factors." 2001 UT 89, TJ13, 22. The United States 
Supreme Court in Cooper Indus, v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 121 S. Ct. 1678 (2001), 
explained why independent, de novo review by an appellate court is appropriate and 
necessary: legal principles relating to the excessiveness of punitive damage awards are 
"fluid concepts that take their substantive content from the particular contexts in which the 
standards are being assessed.... Independent review is therefore necessary if appellate 
courts are to maintain control of, and to clarify, the legal principles." 121 S. Ct. at 1685. In 
this way, the factors to be considered in determining whether punitive damages are 
excessive "will acquire more meaningful content through case-by-case application at the 
appellate level." Id. De novo review by appellate courts based on the required factors 
further "tends to unify precedent" and "stabilize the law."3:> Id. The reasoning of the Court 
Additionally, persuasive reasons exist under the "passion and prejudice" standard in Utah 
R. Civ. P. 59(a)(5) for this Court to review de novo the jury's punitive damage award for 
excessiveness. The same seven factors outlined by this Court in Crookston I apply to both 
the constitutional and "passion and prejudice" analyses. See Crookston I, 817 P.2d at 801 
n.l 1, 808; Campbell, 2001 UT 89,1[22. As stated by this Court in Crookston I: "through the 
requirement of an articulation of reasons for sustaining or modifying damage awards, we 
establish a mechanism for the further development of the law. The express consideration of 
the norms by which awards are determined will promote careful review by both trial and 
appellate courts of the policies underlying punitive damages and the facts pertinent to a 
vindication of those policies on a case-by-case basis." Crookston I, 817 P.2d at 813. 
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in Cooper mirrors in many respects this Court's analysis in Crookston I. The present case 
provides the Court with a unique opportunity to "unify precedent" and "stabilize the law" 
under the facts of this case, among other reasons by contrast with the facts in Campbell 
In addition, punitive damages operate as "private fines" and are "intended to punish 
the defendant and deter future wrongdoing." Id. at 1683, 1686. A jury's award of punitive 
damages is not a finding of "fact." Id. Therefore, as stated by the Court in Cooper: 
Requiring the application of law, rather than a decisionmaker's caprice, does 
more than simply provide citizens notice of what actions may subject them to 
punishment; it also helps to assure the uniform treatment of similarly situated 
persons that is the essence of law itself. 
Id. at 1685 (quoting BMW of N. Am, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 587 (1996)). 
"[Ajppellate review makes certain that the punitive damages are reasonable in their amount 
and rational in light of their purpose to punish what has occurred and to deter its repetition." 
Cooper at 1686 n.9 (citation omitted). 
C. The Seven Crookston I Factors, 
De novo review by this Court of the Crookston I factors demonstrates compelling 
reasons to set aside or to substantially reduce the punitive damages award of $5.5 million. 
The factors to be analyzed by this Court in considering whether the punitive damages award 
was excessive in this case are: 
(i) the relative wealth of the defendant; (ii) the nature of the alleged misconduct; 
(iii) the facts and circumstances surrounding such conduct; (iv) the effect thereof on 
the lives of the plaintiff and others; (v) the probability of future recurrence of the 
In order to meet these objectives, this Court has reduced punitive damages in a number of 
cases. See Crookston I, 817 P.2d at 801, n.12. 
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misconduct; (vi) the relationship of the parties; and (vii) the amount of actual 
damages awarded. 
See Campbell, 2001 UT 89, T[17; Crookston I, 817 P.2d at 808. 
(i) Fairfax's Relative Wealth. In the present case, the award of $5.5 
million in punitive damages, which represented approximately 15% of Fairfax's total wealth 
of approximately $37 million, was disproportionately excessive. In Campbell, this Court 
referred to a Seventh Circuit holding that aa typical punitive damage award may be around 
one percent of the defendant's net worth," as providing a helpful (but not binding) guideline 
in reviewing a punitive damage award. Campbell, 2001 UT 89,1J23 (citing Cash v. Beltman 
N. Am. Co., 900 F.2d 109, 111 n.3 (7th Cir. 1990)). In both Campbell and Crookston, 
where the conduct of State Farm Insurance and Fire Insurance Exchange was highly 
egregious and reprehensible, the percentage of the defendant's wealth, awarded as punitive 
damages was well less than 1%. Campbell, at ^ 26,j7 Crookston I, 817 P.2d at 815-16. The 
award in this case exceeds that 1% guideline by 15 times. 
Moreover, given the evidence in both Campbell and Crookston of long, company-
wide history of extensive and aggravated wrongdoing promoted as a matter of company 
policy by management of both the defendants on a national level, a relatively larger award 
was deemed necessary in those cases to attract the defendants' attention and to deter them 
from further bad conduct. Campbell, 2001 UT 89, 1J26; Crookston I, 817 P.2d at 800. No 
similar showing was made in this case. This was a simple partnership dispute. There were 
37
 In Campbell State Farm's wealth was $54.75 billion and the punitive damages awarded 
were $145 million. Campbell, 2001 UT 89 at Tj 26. In Crookston, Fire Insurance 
Exchange's wealth was $723 million, and the punitive damages awarded were $4 million. 
38 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
no complaints by other partners in properties transferred to the REIT. The compensatory 
damage award alone, representing almost 3% of Fairfax's wealth, is far more than needed to 
attract the company's attention. Consideration of this factor clearly supports substantially 
reducing the punitive damages award. 
(ii) & (iii) Nature of Fairfax's Conduct and Facts and Circumstances 
Surrounding That Conduct. These factors are analyzed together because they are 
interrelated. As stated in Campbell, the second Crookston factor "analyzes the nature of the 
defendant's conduct in terms of its maliciousness, reprehensibility, and wrongfulness." Id., 
TJ27. "It mirrors the [due process] 'reprehensibility' factor described . . . in BMW." Id. The 
third factor "looks to the circumstances surrounding the illegal conduct, particularly with 
respect to what the defendant knew and what was motivating his or her actions." Id., f 35. 
As discussed above, Fairfax's central conduct—the REIT transaction—was for the 
interest and benefit of all partners, including the Smiths. Fairfax believed it was acting to 
save the Mall from foreclosure. Absent the action taken by Fairfax, the Smiths would have 
been worse off. In considering the REIT alternative, including the degree of necessary 
disclosure or consent of the Smiths, Fairfax undisputedly relied on professional advisors. 
The nature of Fairfax's conduct, therefore, was neither malicious nor reprehensible. Nor do 
the circumstances surrounding that conduct support punitive damages. 
Unable to contradict the fact that Fairfax pursued the REIT transaction to avoid 
foreclosure for the benefit of all partners, the Smiths argue that Fairfax had a self-interest in 
the transaction. But the fact that benefiting all the partners necessarily benefited Fairfax as 
well proves nothing. Notably, the law of fiduciary duty requires that a general partner 
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protect and preserve the partnership property and the interests of all partners. See Covalt v. 
High, 675 P.2d 999,1001 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983); 59A Am. Jur. 2d Partnerships, § 426. 
Faced with the alternative of a total loss of the Mall through foreclosure or bankruptcy, 
Fairfax attempted to do exactly that, i.e., protect the interests of all partners. 
Moreover, although the Smiths accuse Fairfax of self-dealing, it is undisputed that 
Fairfax and Price in fact treated the Smiths better than the other partners and partnerships, 
including themselves by increasing the value of the Mall, diluting their interest in the REIT, 
and voluntarily contributing additional REIT units to the Partnerships. In any event, the 
benefits that Fairfax/Price received from the REIT were received independently of the 
Mall's participation in the REIT. Thus, the second and third factors support either 
eliminating or substantially reducing the punitive damages award below the 3:1 ratio, 
(iv) Effect of Fairfax's Conduct on the Smiths and Others. As stated in 
Campbell, this factor "examines how [defendants'] conduct affected other people as well as 
the [plaintiffs.]" Campbell, 2001 UT 89,1J37. "The larger the number of people affected, 
the greater the justification for higher punitive damages." Id. In Crookston II, for example, 
the Court justified a punitive damage award above a 3:1 ratio based on the facts that (a) the 
insurance company's fraudulent practices, carried on nationwide, were inflicted on 
"countless" policyholders over extended periods of time, (b) the defendant had many offices 
in Utah, (c) the fraud was of the most blatant kind and was "committed with almost certain 
knowledge that the Crookstons would be exposed to ruinous bankruptcy," and (d) the 
defendant's conduct seriously affected the plaintiffs in other ways. 860 P.2d at 940-41. The 
effect of the misconduct in Campbell on both the plaintiffs and the public was similarly 
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devastating. See Campbell, 2001 UT 89, UU38-40 ("the Campbells lived for nearly eighteen 
months under constant threat of losing everything they had worked for their whole lives," 
State Farm injured "countless customers," "corrupted its employees" upon threat of losing 
their jobs, and distorted practices industry wide). 
On the facts of this case, there is no justification for even a 3:1 ratio of punitive 
damages here, much less a higher ratio. It is undisputed that had the Mall not been 
conveyed to the REIT, the Smiths would have lost most or all of their partnership interests, 
and Smith could have been personally liable on his guaranty and suffered serious tax 
consequences. 
In addition, there is no evidence that Fairfax's conduct affected anyone else. No 
partner, other than the Smiths, in the Partnerships or in any of some seventy-five other 
partnerships conveying property to the REIT, claimed that the REIT was handled 
improperly or that they were harmed thereby in any way. Further, the REIT was a one-time 
occurrence for Fairfax, unlike the repeated wrongs noted in Campbell and Crookston I. In 
short, analysis of this factor clearly recommends eliminating or reducing the punitive 
damages award here to significantly less than the 3:1 ratio. 
(v) Probability of Future Recurrences. The punitive damages award in this 
case cannot be supported by any policy of deterring a future recurrence of any misconduct. 
The REIT was a one-time occurrence for Fairfax in light of the deteriorating lending and 
shopping mall market that existed at the time. There was no evidence that Fairfax had ever 
engaged in other settings in the conduct of which the Smiths complain. No other partner in 
any partnership selling properties to the REIT made a claim that the REIT was handled 
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improperly. In addition, there was no challenge to the undisputed evidence that Fairfax 
enjoys a good reputation in the real estate industry and, because of that reputation, was able 
to receive concessions from Chemical Bank, including six loan extensions on behalf of the 
Mall. (R 4541 at 354.) Thus, there is nothing in the record to show any likelihood, or even 
a possibility, that there will ever be a recurrence of any alleged misconduct. 
(vi) Relationship of the Parties. As stated in Campbell, this factor analyzes 
"the degree of confidence and trust placed in the defendant." Campbell, 2001 UT 89, [^44. 
"The greater the trust placed in the defendant, the more appropriate the imposition of a large 
punitive damage award." Id. 
Although a fiduciary relationship may sometimes support a large punitive damages 
award, see id., the facts of this case do not warrant treating that as a compelling factor here. 
The Smiths raised their own objections to the REIT, thereby indicating their own 
independent analysis of the situation. The Smiths did not present any evidence that they 
relied to their detriment on any disclosure, failure to disclose, or other conduct on the part of 
Fairfax as summarized in the Trial Court's punitive damage findings. Moreover, most of 
the alleged non-disclosures were either disclosed in substance by Fairfax prior to the closing 
of the REIT, or were prompted by advice of counsel. 
The undisputed evidence showed that Fairfax's decision to contribute the Mall to the 
REIT was motivated solely to save the Mall rather than to promote any allegedly conflicting 
interest Fairfax or Price may have had in the REIT. Fairfax did not need to include the Mall 
for the REIT to succeed. The other properties conveyed to the REIT were adequate to serve 
that purpose. Id. Indeed, Fairfax's return from the REIT due to the other partnerships was 
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in fact decreased by the Smiths' participation in the REIT. It was undisputed that the 
Smiths were awarded special concessions (to Price's detriment) not given to the other 
partnerships, to either resolve the Smiths' objections or to prevent adverse tax consequences 
to the Smiths. 
(vii) Ratio of Punitive to Compensatory Damages. This Court has made it 
clear that "the amount of a punitive damage award generally must bear a 'reasonable and 
rational' relationship to the actual damages." Crookston I, 817 P.2d at 810. As a general 
rule, "where the punitives are well below $100,000, punitive damage awards beyond a 3 to 
1 ratio to actual damages have seldom been upheld and . . . where the award is in excess of 
$100,000, [the Court has] indicated some inclination to overturn awards having ratios of 
less than 3 to 1." Id. 
The ratio of punitive damages ($5.5 million) to the total damages ($1.1 million) in 
the present case is 5 to 1. Thus, punitive damages in this case significantly exceed the 
bounds of the general ratio pattern set by this Court's prior decisions. See Crookston I, 817 
P.2dat807, 810. 
More importantly, when the Court removes prejudgment interest from the base 
damages, as it should, the ratio of punitives to non-prejudgment interest compensatory 
damages of $410,000 becomes an even more egregious ratio of 13 to 1. Utah courts have 
not expressly considered whether prejudgment interest is included in the compensatory base 
in this type of review. However, in reviewing the punitive damages in this case, the Court 
TO 
Under both Crookston I and Crookston II, however, punitive damages on "soft" 
compensatory damages "must be awarded with caution" and "are not to be given equal 
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should review the punitive damages under a 13:1 ratio (by excluding prejudgment interest 
from consideration) for three reasons. First, as discussed below, prejudgment interest is a 
question of law for the court. The jury should not have had evidence of such interest before 
it at the time of its punitive damages deliberations so that such interest cannot support the 
jury's award. Second, prejudgment interest is not available in this case because damages 
were not calculable with mathematical certainty. Third, calculating punitive damages as a 
multiplier of an interest award is the economic equivalent of awarding prejudgment interest 
on the punitive damages themselves, Seminole Pipeline Co., Mapco, Inc. v. Broad Leaf 
Partners, 979 S.W.2d 730, 759 (Tex. Ct. App. 1998) (detailed demonstration of economic 
equivalence)—a practice this Court has already rejected. First Sec. Bank v. J.B.J. 
Feedyards, 653 P.2d 591, 600 (Utah 1982). 
The high ratio is yet another indication that the punitive damage award is excessive 
in this case and in violation of Fairfax's due process rights, and that the jury acted out of 
passion or prejudice . Moreover, the award in no way bears a "reasonable and rational 
relationship to the actual damages,'' as required by Crookston I, 817 P.2d at 810. 
In summary, the Crookston factors weigh heavily against the punitive damages 
award in this case and demonstrate its excessiveness. Thus, in the event that the Court does 
not remand for entry of judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the punitive damages 
weight with hard compensatory damages when evaluating their relationship between 
punitive and compensatory damages." Crookston II, 860 P.2d at 940; Crookston I, 817 
P.2d at 806, 811-12 n.29. A similar analysis here suggests that prejudgment interest 
should not be included in the damages base for purposes of calculating the punitive 
damages ratio. And since the jury's verdict necessarily included at least some amount of 
expert fees, that amount is also not a proper damage component for calculating the ratio. 
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claim, this Court should reduce the punitive damages significantly below the 3:1 guideline 
or, alternatively, grant a new trial. 
IV. The Trial Court Erred By Disregarding Controlling Utah Law 
Precluding Prejudgment Interest on an Unliquidated Claim and by 
Concluding That There Was Evidence Sufficient to Support the Amount 
of the Jury's Award of Prejudgment Interest. 
Over Fairfax's objection, the Smiths presented evidence of, and the jury awarded, 
$690,000 in prejudgment interest on breach-of-fiduciary-duty damages, which were based 
on or derived from the fair market, appraised pre-REIT value of the Partnerships. (P-173; R 
4388.) The Trial Court committed three errors with respect to prejudgment interest: first, 
the Trial Court erred in submitting the issue to the jury; second, the Trial Court erred by 
permitting interest on any damages derived from an estimate of the fair market value of the 
Partnerships; and third, the Trial Court erred in denying Fairfax's motion for a new trial or 
remittitur based on the jury's excessive award. 
A. The Trial Court Erred In Submitting the Issue of Prejudgment Interest 
to the Jury. 
It is well settled that the "decision to grant or deny prejudgment interest presents a 
question of law." Cornia v. Wilcox, 898 P.2d 1379, 1387 (Utah 1995). As such, the trial 
court erred in submitting the issue of prejudgment interest to the jury. As discussed above, 
The same conclusion is directed by federal law. Under the three guideposts for federal 
due process analysis - "'[1] the degree of reprehensibility of the [conduct]; [2] the disparity 
between the harm suffered . . . and [the] punitive damages award; and [3] the difference 
between this remedy [the punitive damage award] and the . . . penalties authorized or 
imposed in comparable cases,'" Campbell, 2001 UT 89, f 39 (citing BMW, 517 U.S. at 574-
75 (1996) - the award here is excessive and requires reversal or significant reduction. 
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that submission prejudiced Fairfax in the consideration of punitive damages, and, as will be 
discussed below, the excessive award of prejudgment interest itself suggests that the jury 
acted out of prejudice or passion. 
B. The Trial Court Erred in Permitting an Award of Prejudgment Interest 
on the Fair Market Value of the Smiths' Partnership Interest 
Under Utah law, prejudgment interest should not have been awarded on damages 
derived from or based on the fair market value of the Partnerships. The Smiths' argument 
that there is a breach of fiduciary duty exception to such rules is inconsistent with Utah 
1. Fair Market Value Damages Are Not Calculable with 
Mathematical Accuracy. 
In Utah, the law is clear that prejudgment interest is not available where damages 
"cannot be calculated with mathematical accuracy " Cornia, 898 P.2d at 1387 (citations 
omitted). This test is not satisfied where the amount of damages is a matter of "judgment" 
or where an expert's damage "estimate" is "by no means the only way to arrive at [the 
damage]." Id. The Utah Court of Appeals has already held on several occasions that the 
valuation of real property may be inherently uncertain so as to preclude an award of 
The Trial Court ruled, as a matter of first impression under Utah law, that the Smiths 
would be entitled to "a reasonable amount of interest" on any breach of fiduciary duty 
damages. (R 4539 at 92-99; 4543 at 829.) The Trial Court instructed the jury that, "In 
the case of a breach of fiduciary duty, the benefit which [Fairfax] would have derived 
from the breach may be of a continuing nature up to the time of trial, and if so, the 
limited partners, Smiths, will be entitled to the time value of the monies on the amount of 
damages sustained by the Smiths since the date of the breach of fiduciary duty to the date 
of trial. (R 3720 (Instr. No. 44).) 
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prejudgment interest. Klinger v. Kightly, 889 P.2d 1372, 1381 (Utah Ct. App. 1995); Smith 
v. Linmar Energy Corp., 790 P.2d 1222, 1226 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); Price-Orem Inv. Co. v. 
Rollins, Brown & Gunnell, 784 P.2d 475, 482-83 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
In the present case, the starting point of the Smiths' valuation of their Partnership 
interest was an appraisal of the Mall by John Howden. (R 4542 at 549-743) (Howden's 
testimony); 4543 at 945-53 (Norman's use of Howden's appraisal).) However, Howden 
testified that there is no single method for appraising real property; rather, appraisers use 
three different approaches to value real property: a cost-based approach, a sales-comparison 
approach, and an income-capitalization approach, each of which requires the exercise of an 
appraiser's professional judgment. (R 4543 at 549; see also 4542 at 555, 563-64. 627-32; 
4543 at 659, 679-82.) He used two of these approaches to obtain values between 
$15,900,000 to $16,400,000. In contrast, Fairfax presented two appraisals indicating a fair 
market value of $11,400,000 and $12,700,000. (R 4546 at 1380; 4547 at 1498.) Howden 
succinctly summarized the inherent uncertainty in appraisals when he testified: "appraising 
is not a science—it is an art, not a science—we can have different opinions of value." 
(R 4543 at 682; see also R 4546 at 1345,1348,1447,1464 (appraisals are "estimates" and 
matters of "opinion" and it is common for appraisers to reach varying conclusions).) 
Inasmuch as fair market value was based on estimates derived from a variety of 
methods of calculation, each of which required the use of an appraiser's best judgment, the 
Smiths' fair market value damages cannot accrue prejudgment interest under Utah law. 
2. There Is No Fiduciary Exception to Utah's Prejudgment Interest Rules. 
The Smiths argued (and the Trial Court agreed) that prejudgment interest is allowed 
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on damages for breach of fiduciary duty, even if those damages are not calculable with 
mathematical accuracy—relying exclusively on cases from other jurisdictions awarding 
prejudgment interest for breach of fiduciary duty on equitable grounds under a discretionary 
standard.41 (R 3720 (Instruction No. 44); 4543 at 829). 
However, a discretionary award of prejudgment interest based on equitable 
principles would be contrary to almost a century of precedent from this Court. In its 
landmark decision in Fell v. Union Pac. Ry. Co., 88 P. 1003 (Utah 1907), this Court 
criticized discretionary awards of prejudgment interest: 
There is another class of cases where the matter is relegated to the jury or the court 
trying the case to allow interest or not, as in their judgment may seem proper, as a 
part of the damages to be allowed. This rule does not seem to be based upon any 
sound reason. Moreover, it must lead to uncertainty, and may tend to favoritism in 
its application. . . . Whenever possible, it ought not be left to the mere caprice of 
either court or jury to either grant or withhold that which is due. A fixed rule, when 
based on sound principles, is, in most instances, a safer guide than the judgment of a 
few individuals, however honest or pure their motives 
41
 See In re Wernick, 535 N.E.2d 876, 888 (111. 1989) ("In Illinois, prejudgment interest 
may be recovered when warranted by equitable considerations . . . within the sound 
discretion of the trial judge"); Ryan v. City of Chicago, 654 N.E.2d 483, 489 (111. App. 
1995) ("An equitable award of interest is a matter within the circuit court's sound 
discretion"); Jefferson NatT Bank v. Cen. NatT Bank, 700 F.2d 1143, 1155 (7th Cir. 
1983) ("discretion of the court" under Illinois law); Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 
Inc., 637 F.2d 77, 86-87 (2d Cir. 1980) (federal securities laws) ("an award of 
prejudgment interest is a matter of judicial discretion" and is "governed by fundamental 
considerations of fairness"); In re Lash, 747 A.2d 327, 335 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2000) ("The decision to award or deny pre-judgment interest is within the discretion of 
the trial judge," but the "discretion, however, 'must be exercised equitably'") (citation 
omitted); McDermott v. Party City Corp., 11 F. Supp.2d 612, 633 (E.D. Pa. 1998) ("it is 
within the discretion of the court to award prejudgment interest with regard to 
unliquidated sums, such as that for breach of fiduciary duty"); Michelson v. Hamada, 36 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 343, 353 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (under California statute, "interest may be 
given, in the discretion of the jury") (citation omitted) (emphasis in the original). 
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Id. at 1006 (emphasis added); see also Cornia, 898 P.2d at 1387 (entitlement to prejudgment 
interest is a question of law reviewed for correctness rather than a matter of discretion 
reviewed for an abuse of discretion). Moreover, this Court has also held that prejudgment 
interest awards are inappropriate in cases of an equitable nature, which precedent is 
inconsistent with an equitable basis for the Smiths' claimed award. See, e.g., Bellon v. 
Malnar, 808 P.2d 1089, 1097 (Utah 1991); see also Dejavue, Inc. v. U.S. Energy Corp., 
1999 UT App. 335, ^24, 993 P.2d 222. Furthermore, Utah courts have in fact applied 
traditional prejudgment interest principles in breach of fiduciary cases. See Lefavi v. 
Bertoch, 2000 UT App. 5,1ffl22-25, 994 P.2d 817. 
Thus, this Court should reject the Smiths' new argument for prejudgment interest on 
the established and well-founded precedent in this state. 
C. The Trial Court Erred in Not Reducing or Vacating the Jury's Excessive 
Award of Interest 
The Trial Court also erred in refusing to correct the jury's excessive prejudgment 
interest award of $690,000, which was $92,779 higher than the only evidence of 
prejudgment interest presented by Norman for the Smiths. (P-173; R 3799-801; 4510.) The 
evidence was insufficient to justify that verdict, resulting in "excessive . . . damages, 
appearing to have been given under the influence of passion or prejudice," warranting a new 
trial. Utah R. Civ. P. 59(a)(5); see also State v. Brown, 531 P.2d 1294, 1295, 1297 (Utah 
1975); Bennion v. LeGrand Johnson Constr. Co., 701 P.2d 1078,1084 (Utah 1985). This 
Court must, at a minimum, reduce the prejudgment interest damages by $92,779 or remand 
for a new trial on this issue. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, the trial court's judgment on the verdict should be 
reversed and remanded for entry of judgment n.o.v. on (1) all claims because the REIT was 
the only alternative to save the Mall, (2) all punitive damages claims because of the failure 
to establish willful misconduct, and/or (3) all claims for interest. If the Court does not 
remand for entry of judgment n.o.v. on these issues, it should remand for a new trial. 
Alternatively, this Court should reduce the punitive damages award to an appropriate 
amount under Utah law and the circumstances of this case, or remand for a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted this 29th day of July, 2002. 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
UouA? 
Jame/S. Jardine 
Attefrneys for Ap^Hants 
663414 
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claims of the Plaintiffs (sometimes the "Smiths" herein) for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of 
contract, conversion of partnership property, and punitive damages, as well as the defendants' Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Price Development Company (n/k/a Fairfax Realty, Inc.) claim for declaratory judgment, the 
Plaintiffs appearing through and being represented by their attorneys of record, Robert S. 
Campbell and James E. Magleby of Salt Lake City and the Defendants appearing through and 
being represented by their counsel of record, Reed L. Martineau and Rex E. Madsen of Salt 
Lake City. 
A jury of eight persons with one alternate juror having been selected and empaneled by 
the Court to try the issues of fact, opening statements were made and evidence and testimony 
thereafter received on March 26, 2001 and continuing for 14 court trial days, during which time 
witnesses were sworn and testified, and documents were received by the Court. The parties, 
pursuant to stipulation, reserved the issue of attorneys' fees to the prevailing party as provided 
by Article 19 of the Partnership Agreements to be resolved by the Court after the return the 
jury's special verdict. 
On Wednesday, April 11,2001, both sides having rested their cases, the Court charged 
the jury as to the law to be applied to the evidence with respect to whether Price Development 
Company had breached its fiduciary duty to the Smiths, whether Price Development Company 
had breached its contract with the Smiths, and if so, whether Price Development Company had 
converted partnership assets and the damages, if any, sustained by the Smiths as a proximate 
cause or consequence of Price Development's conduct as well as whether punitive damages 
should be entered against Price Development Company and in favor of the Smiths. Closing 
argument was presented on the same day, April 11, 2001 and at approximately 3:10 p.m., the 
jury retired to deliberate on their special verdict. 
At approximately 7:05 p.m. on said 11 th day of April, 2001, the jury returned into open 
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Court the following Special Verdict: 
"SPECIAL VERDICT OF THE JURY 
1. Did the defendant, Price Development Company, breach the partnership 
agreements, as alleged by plaintiffs? 
ANSWER: Yes X No 
2. Did the defendant Price Development Company, breach its fiduciary duties, as 
alleged by plaintiffs? 
ANSWER: Yes X No 
If the answer to this question is "No," 
do not answer Question No. 3. 
3. Was Price Development Company's breach of fiduciary duty a proximate cause 
of any damages sustained by plaintiffs? 
ANSWER: Yes X No 
4. Did the defendant Price Development Company, convert property belonging to 
plaintiffs? 
ANSWER: Yes X No 
5. If you answered either Question Nos. 1,3, or 4 "Yes," then state the total amount 
of all damages, if any, sustained by all plaintiffs together. 
DAMAGES: $ 410,000 (Not including time value of money 
or "interest.") 
DAMAGES due to time value of money or "interest." 
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$ 690,000 
6. Should punitive damages be awarded against Price Development Company and 
in favor of the Smiths? 
ANSWER: Yes X No 
Dated this 11 th day of April 2001. 
Ashley James Anderson 
Foreperson" 
The Court having received and entered the Special Verdict of the Jury, thereupon 
proceeded with the punitive damage phase of the case, pursuant to stipulation of the parties, 
on the following morning, Thursday, April 12,2001. Testimony and evidence were received with 
respect to the wealth and financial position of the defendant, Price Development Company, 
further closing arguments were made by counsel for the respective parties, and the jury 
thereupon retired to consider its Special Verdict on Punitive Damages. 
At approximately 12:05 p.m. on said day, April 12, 2001, the jury returned into open 
Court its Special Verdict Re Punitive Damages as follows: 
"MEMBERS OF THE JURY: 
What amount of punitive damages should be awarded against Price 
Development Company? 
$ 5.500,000 
Dated this 12th day of April, 2001. 
Ashley James Anderson 
Foreperson" 
The Court thereupon received the Special Verdict on Punitive Damages and entered it 
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upon the records of the Court. No party asked for the jury to be polled and the jury panel was 
thereupon dismissed and the Court adjourned with counsel for the Plaintiffs being requested to 
prepare the form of judgment. 
The Court being now fully advised as to all and singular the law and fact in the premises, 
having concluded that the Special Verdict of the Jury and the Special Verdict Re Punitive 
Damages were duly and properly returned, and having entered Special Findings of the Court 
determining that there was evidence for the jury from which it could reasonably conclude that 
the amount of punitive damages awarded by the jury was justified under the facts and 
circumstances, which Special Findings should be annexed to and made a part of the Judgment, 
and that a Judgment should be thereupon entered upon said Verdicts in favor of the Smith 
Parties and against Price Development Company n/k/a Fairfax Realty, Inc. for breach of 
fiduciary duty, conversion of partnership property, breach of contract and punitive damages and 
that Price Development Company's claim for declaratory judgment should be denied and hence 
dismissed, and that the Court, pursuant to agreement and stipulation of the parties, has 
determined the amount of attorneys' fees to be awarded to Smiths as the prevailing party under 
Article 19 of both North Plains Development Partnership and the North Plains Land Partnership 
and as the prevailing party on the breach of fiduciary duty claims. 
NOW, THEREFORE, for good cause shown, 
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
I. THAT on the Special Verdict of the jury for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of 
contract and conversion of the partnership property, judgment be, and the same 
is hereby entered, in favor of Armand L Smith, individually and as Trustee for 
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the Armand L. Smith, Jr. Trust and the Shannon S. Windham Trust, and Virginia 
L Smith and against Price Development Company n/k/a Fairfax Realty, Inc. in 
the sum and amount of $1,100,000.00, inclusive of $690,000.00 due to the time 
value of money or interest on the breach of fiduciary duty claims; 
II. THAT on the Special Verdict of the Jury Re Punitive Damages for breach of 
fiduciary duty, judgment be, and the same is hereby entered, in favor of Armand 
L Smith, individually and as Trustee for the Armand L Smith, Jr. Trust and the 
Shannon S. Windham Trust, and Virginia L Smith and against Price 
Development Company n/k/a Fairfax Realty, Inc. in the sum and amount of 
$5,500,000.00; 
III. THAT the combined and total judgment of $6,600,000.00 be and the same shall 
bear interest from the date of the judgment as provided by law; 
IV. THAT the Plaintiffs, Smith Parties, be and they are hereby entitled to an award 
of attorneys' fees, costs and expenses as the prevailing party under Article 19 
of the partnership agreements and under their claims for breach of fiduciary duty. 
The Court has considered the attorney fee application of $517,611.40 submitted 
by the Smith Parties, the affidavit submitted in support of the application by 
Carmen K. Kipp, Esq., and the other papers submitted by both parties on the 
issue of attorney fees. Based on these submissions, the Court finds and 
concludes as follows: 
a. That Price Development has not contested that the Smiths are entitled 
to recover attorney fees and costs under the partnership agreements and 
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for their breach of fiduciary duty claims; 
b. That Price Development has not contested the Smiths Parties' attorney 
fee application to the extent it seeks $457,544.44, and thus this amount 
of attorney fees are reasonable. Independently, the Court finds these 
fees and costs are reasonable under the factors set forth in Dixie State 
Bank and as established by the uncontested affidavit of Carmen E. Kipp, 
Esq. 
c. That the Smith Parties are also entitled to recover attorney fees and 
costs in the amount of (i) $34,000.00 for time spent on this case by lead 
trial counsel, Roberts. Campbell; (ii) $22,534.16 for attorney fees and 
costs incurred from the Snell & Wilmer law firm; and (iii) $3,522.88 for 
attorney fees and costs incurred from the Leverick & Musselman law 
firm. The Court further finds these attorney fees and costs are 
reasonable and consistent with the factors to be considered under Dixie 
State Bank, other controlling precedent, the additional factors set forth in 
the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, and as established by the 
uncontested affidavit of Carmen E. Kipp, Esq. 
d. That Judgement be and is hereby entered in favor of Armand L. Smith, 
individually and as trustee and Virginia L Smith and against Price 
Development Company, n/k/a Fairfax Realty, Inc. for and in the amount 
of $517,611.40 as reasonable attorney fees and $7,133.26 for 
reasonable costs and expenses; 
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V. THAT the Plaintiffs are entitled to their costs and expenses of Court, as provided 
by law; 
VI. THAT Defendants, Price Development Company n/k/a Fairfax Realty, Inc. shall 
take nothing by its claim of declaratory judgment, and the said claim be and the 
same is hereby dismissed, no cause^B&a t^jgn, with prejudice. 
DATED this day of June, 20 
FRANfTG. N 
Presiding District 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
ROBERT S. CAMPBELL, JR. 
JAMES E. MAGLEBY 
Attorneys for Armand L. Smith and 
Virginia L. Smith, et al. 
REED L. MARTINEAU 
REX E. MADSEN 
Attorneys for Price Development Company 
n/k/a Fairfax Realty, Inc., et al. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a member of and/or employed by the law firm of VanCott 
Bagley Cornwall & McCarthy, Suite 1600 Key Bank Tower, 50 South Main Street, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, 84145-0340, and that in said capacity and pursuant to Rule 5(b), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, a true and correct copy of the foregoing JUDGMENT ON SPECIAL VERDICTS OF 
THE JURY FOR COMPENSATORY & PUNITIVE DAMAGES was delivered to the following 
his O ^ g a v of June, 2001 by: 
X ] Hand Delivery 
] Facsimile No. 
] Depositing the same in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
] Federal Express 
] Certified Mail, Receipt No. , return receipt requested 
Reed L. Martineau, Esq. 
Rex E. Madsen, Esq. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Attorneys for Defendants 
s W ^ o kCA^LJl 
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ROBERT S. CAMPBELL, JR. (0557) 
Van Cott Bagley Cornwall & McCarthy 
Key Bank Tower, Suite 1250 
50 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
Facsimile: (801) 521-9598 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
Armand L. Smith and Virginia L. Smith 
Deputy Clerk 
JAMES E. MAGLEBY 
Ballard Spahr, Andrews & Ingersoll LLP 
One Utah Center, Suite 600 
201 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Telephone: (801)531-3000 
Facsimile: (801) 531-3001 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ARMAND L SMITH, Individually and as 
Trustee for the Armand L. Smith, Jr. 
Trust and the Shannon S. Windham 
Trust, and VIRGINIA L. SMITH, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
PRICE DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, a 
Utah corporation, n/k/a FAIRFAX 
REALTY, INC., NORTH PLAINS LAND 
COMPANY, LTD., a Utah limited 
partnership, and NORTH PLAINS 
DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, LTD., a 
Utah limited partnership, 
Defendants. 
SPECIAL FINDINGS OF 
THE COURT ON 
PUNITIVE DAMAGE 
VERDICT OF THE JURY 
Civil No. 940904312CV 
Honorable Frank G. Noel 
Presiding District Court Judge 
Pursuant to the precedent of the Utah Supreme Court in Crookston v. Fire Insurance 
Exchange, 817 P.2d 789, 811 (Utah 1991), the Court herewith makes and enters Special 
Findings of Fact with respect to the punitive damage award returned by the jury in the above-
referenced case on the 11 th and 12th days of April, 2001, as follows: Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1. The jury empaneled in this case returned into open Court a verdict of 
compensatory damages on April 11, 2001 of $1,100,000 and answered "Yes" to 
the question of whether punitive damages should be awarded against Price 
Development Company and in favor of the Smiths 
2 On the following day, April 12, 2001, the jury returned into open Court a verdict 
finding that the amount of punitive damages to be awarded against Price 
Development Company was $5,500,000 
3. With respect the jury's verdict of breach of fiduciary duty and conversion of 
partnership property by Price Development Company, there was substantial 
substantive evidence before the jury upon which a punitive damage award of 
$5,500,000 00 is considered reasonable 
4 The jury could have found by clear and convincing evidence a pattern of deceit, 
failure to disclose and misrepresentation with respect to the three "options" which 
Price Development personnel discussed with Armand Smith relative to formation 
by Price Development of a real estate investment trust To that end, there was 
substantial evidence 
that Price Development failed to disclose to the Smiths that the 
Contribution Agreements were executed by Price Development in late 
September or October 1993, in which Price Development agreed to 
convey the North Plains Mall Property to another Price entity, Price 
Development Company, a Maryland limited partnership, for the benefit 
of the JP Realty REIT, 
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that said disclosure should have been made during the month of 
September, October or November, 1993, but was not made even in early 
December 1993 when Price Development submitted to Smiths a 
"preliminary estimate" of the "REIT value" of the North Plains Mall; 
that the Contribution Agreement was not disclosed to the Smiths by Price 
Development until April 1994, nearly three months after the formation of 
the JP Realty REIT; 
that Price Development did not disclose to Smiths until March 1994 that 
they no longer had options with respect to their 15% interest of the North 
Plains Mall being kept out of the REIT, or such interest being purchased 
at the fair market value thereof; 
that the letter of March 8,1994 setting forth "an original computation" and 
a "revised computation" of the Smiths7 interest in the allocated REIT 
value of the North Plains Mall was false, misleading and deceitful; 
that Price Development Company did not want the Smiths to interfere by 
filing an adverse claim or potential lawsuit prior to January 21,1994 when 
the J. P. Realty REIT was created, established and implemented; 
that the March 8,1994 "revised calculation" of 312 units was intentionally 
misleading and was in wanton disregard of the partnership rights of the 
Smiths in the North Plains Mall Property; 
that Price Development Company never made an accurate accounting 
to the Smiths as to Price Development's own calculation of the "REIT 
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value" of the Smiths' interest until the year 2000, after nearly six years of 
litigation brought by Smiths to obtain an accounting and relief for breach 
of fiduciary duty; 
Price Development paid itself, as general partner, excessive fees beyond 
that clearly set forth in the Partnership Agreements; 
Price Development failed to maintain a separate bank account for the 
North Plains Mall Partnerships, co-mingling all funds from all Price owned 
properties and making it difficult to isolate and allocate revenues, costs, 
expenses and net income of the North Plains Mall Property; 
that Price Development accrued to itself interest on monies it advanced 
to the Partnerships, which it referred to as capital call contributions, but 
did not pay or accrue to the Smiths interest on their proportionate capital 
call contributions; 
that the Smiths were never advised by Price Development, as general 
partner, of the potential conflicts which it and the Price principals had with 
respect to the conveyance of the North Plains Mali Property from Price 
Development Company to Price Development Company, a Maryland 
limited partnership, for the benefit of the JP Realty REIT; 
that there was substantial evidence upon which the jury could have found 
that the conduct of Price Development Company in this case was 
intentional and in wanton disregard of the rights of the Smiths. 
that the wealth of Price Development Company was reasonably in 
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excess of $37,000,000 as of the end of December 1999. 
that the punitive damage award of the jury in this case of $5,500,000 was 
within the zone of reasonableness given the conduct of Price 
Development and the circumstances of the case and clearly was not 
excessive or disproportionate as to suggest or evidence passion or 
prejudice of the jury; 
Dated this ^ /day of June, 2001. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that ! am a member of and/or employed by the law firm of VanCott 
Bagley Cornwall & McCarthy, Suite 1600 Key Bank Tower, 50 South Main Street, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, 8414-0340, and that in said capacity and pursuant to Rule 5(b), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, a true and correct copy of the foregoing SPECIAL FINDINGS OF THE COURT ON 
PUNITIVE DAMAGE VERDICT OF THE JURY was delivered to the following this ^fday 
of June, 2001 by: 
X ] Hand Delivery 
] Facsimile No. 
] Depositing the same in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
] Federal Express 
] Certified Mail, Receipt No. , return receipt requested 
Reed L. Martineau, Esq. 
Rex E. Madsen, Esq. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Attorneys for Defendants 
ACQux/LJ 
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p A". 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
FAIRFAX REALTY INC., Et al, 
Plaintiff, 
Vs 
ARMAND L. SMITH, Et al, 
Defendant. 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NO.940904312CV 
Judge Frank G. Noel 
This matter is before the Court on a Motion For Summary 
Judgment filed on behalf of Counterclaimants Armand L. Smith, 
Individually and as Trustee, and Virginia L. Smith. The movants 
argue that this Court can rule as a matter of law that plaintiffs 
breached their fiduciary duty and their contract with defendants by 
selling and purchasing certain partnership assets. The Court is of 
the opinion that genuine issues of fact exist in this matter which 
precludes the granting of the summary judgment. 
With regard to the breach of fiduciary duty claim, there are 
issues of fact as to whether under all the circumstances plaintiffs 
acted fairly and in the best interest of the partnership. With 
regard to the breach of partnership agreement claim, the Court is 
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FAIRFAX VS. SMITH PAGE TWO MINUTE ENTRY 
opinion that a factual question exists as to whether the consent of 
the partners was needed in order to engage in the subject 
transactions and the related question of whether the transactions 
in question were for a partnership purpose. There are of course 
other related factual issues. 
Accordingly, the Motion For Summary Judgment is denied. 
Counsel for plaintiff's is to prepare an appropriate Order. 
Dated this 3 .Day of AUGUST, 1999: 
Honorable Franl^G. Noe. 
Presiding Judge 
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FAIRFAX VS. SMITH PAGE THREE MINUTE ENTRY 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing MINUTE ENTRY, postage prepaid, to the following, this 
-J? day of AUGUST, 1999: 
Robert S. Campbell 
Gordon W. Campbell 
Edward W. McBride 
Campbell Moxley & Campbell 
111 East Broadway, Suite 880 
SLC, UT 84111 
Reed L. Martineau, Esq. 
Michael R. Carlston, Esq. 
Rex E. Madsen, Esq. 
Snow, Christensen & Martineau 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
P.O. Box 45000 
SLC, UT 84145 
no. 
Deputy Court Clerk 
LAA^ 
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ROBERT S. CAMPBELL, JR. (0557) 
BERMAN, GAUFIN, TOMSIC, SAVAGE & CAMPBELL 
Key Bank Tower, Suite 1250 
50 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Telephone: (801) 328-2200 
Attorneys for Defendants and Counterclaimants 
Armand L. Smith and Virginia L. Smith 
FILID DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
MAR 2 2 2001 
By- 1 - 4 ^ 
OUNTY 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ARMAND L. SMITH, Individually and as 
Trustee for the Armand L. Smith, Jr. 
Trust and the Shannon S. Windham 
Trust, and VIRGINIA L. SMITH, 
Counterclaim Plaintiffs 
and Defendants, 
PRICE DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, a 
Utah corporation, n/k/a FAIRFAX 
REALTY, INC., NORTH PLAINS LAND 
COMPANY, LTD., a Utah limited 
partnership, and NORTH PLAINS 
DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, LTD., a 
Utah limited partnership, 
Counterclaim 
Defendants and 
Plaintiffs. 
ORDER ON 
PRETRIAL MOTIONS 
Civil No. 940904312CV 
Honorable Frank G. Noel 
Presiding District Court Judge 
A number of pretrial motions, including motions for partial summary judgment filed by both 
parties, came on regularly for hearing before the Court, the HONORABLE FRANK E. NOEL, 
Presiding District Judge, on Tuesday, March 13, 2001, at 2:00 p.m. in Courtroom S45 of the 
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Matheson Court House in Salt Lake City, Utah, the Counterclaim Plaintiffs and Defendants Armand 
L. Smith, individually and as Trustee and Virginia L. Smith ("Smiths"), being represented by their 
counsel, Robert S. Campbell, Jr. of Berman Gaufin Tomsic Savage & Campbell of Salt Lake City, 
Utah and the Counterclaim Defendants and Plaintiffs, Price Development Company et al. ("Price 
Development") being represented by their counsel, Rex E. Madsen of Snow Christensen and 
Martineau of Salt Lake City, Utah. 
Specifically, the following motions were before the Court for determination: 
SMITHS' MOTIONS IN LIMINE AND MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
1 Motion in Limine to Exclude the Purported Expert Witness, Andrew S. Oliver 
2 Counterclaim Plaintiffs' Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony of Alan L. Gosule, Esq. 
3 Counterclaim Plaintiffs Smiths' Motion in Limine to Preclude the Purported Expert 
Testimony of R. Todd Neilson 
4 Counterclaim Plaintiffs Smiths' Motion in Limine to Exclude Portions of Report and 
Purported Expert Testimony of Lawrence S. Kaplan 
5 Counterclaim Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment That, as a Matter of 
Law, Both Partnership Agreements Required Consent of the Smiths' Interests for 
Price Development Company to Assign and Transfer the Partnership Real Property 
to the REIT 
PRICE DEVELOPMENT COMPANY'S MOTIONS IN LIMINE AND MOTION FOR PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
6 Price Development Company's Motion in Limine RE Exclusion of Evidence 
Concerning Penalty Provision of Partnership Agreements 
7 Price Development Company's Motion in Limine RE Damages 
8 Price Development Company's Motion in Limine to Exclude the Expert Report and 
Testimony of Merrill Norman 
9 Price Development Company's Motion in Limine to Exclude the Expert Report and 
Testimony of John Howden 
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10 Price Development Company' Motion in Limine RE Exclusion of Evidence 
Concerning Loss of Purchasing Power 
11 Price Development Company's Motion for Declaratory and Partial Summary 
Judgment 
The Court, having received and considered the above-noted motions, the memoranda and 
supporting materials submitted by the respective Parties, and having weighed and considered oral 
argument of respective Counsel, and for good cause shown, hereby ORDERS 
1. That the Smiths' motion for partial summary judgment (motion no 5 above) is 
DENIED 
2 That the Smiths' motions in limine to exclude the expert witness reports and 
testimony of Price Development's witnesses Andrew S Oliver, Alan L Gosule, R 
Todd Nielsen, and Lawrence S Kaplan (motion nos 1, 2, 3, and 4 above), are 
GRANTED IN PART, in that the Court rules that the measure of damages for the 
Smiths' breach of contract claims are as a matter of law based upon the Fair Market 
Value of the Smiths' partnership interests, and the "REIT value" is not relevant to 
this measure of damages The remaining issues raised in the motions in limine, 
including whether and how the REIT value is admissible with regard to the Smiths' 
breach of fiduciary duty claims, are taken under advisement, and the Court will rule 
on the admissibility of the reports and / or testimony at the time of trial, based upon 
the development of the evidence 
3 That Price Development's motion for declaratory partial summary judgment (motion 
no 11 above) is DENIED 
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4. That Price Development's motions in limine regarding damages and to the exclude 
the expert report of John Howden (motion nos. 7 and 9 above) are withdrawn by 
Price Development, in light of the Court's denial of Price Development's motion for 
partial summary judgment. 
5. That Price Development's motion in limine regarding the Article IX clause, 
designated by Price Development as the "penalty provision" of the partnership 
agreements (motion no. 6 above) is GRANTED. 
6. That Price Development's motion in limine regarding the loss of purchasing power 
(motion no. 10 above) is taken under advisement. 
7. That Price Development's motion in limine to exclude the expert witness report and 
testimony of the Smiths' witness Merrill Norman (motion no 8 above), is reserved, 
and the Court will rule on the admissibility of the report and/or testimony at trial, 
based upon the development of the evidence. 
DATED this <5i2rday of March, 2001. 
BY ORDER OF THE COURT 
Honorable Frank E. Noel \ 
Presiding State District Judge 
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APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
ROBERTS. CAMPBELL, JR. 
of and for 
BERMAN, GAUFIN, TOMSIC, SAVAGE & CAMPBELL 
Attorneys for Defendants and Counterclaimants 
Armand L Smith and Virginia L Smith 
REED L MARTINEAU 
REX MADSEN 
of and for 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Counterclaim Defendants 
Price Development Company, n/k/a 
Fairfax Realty, Inc., North Plains Land Company, Ltd., 
and North Plains Development Company, Ltd. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a member of and/or employed by the law firm of Berman Gaufin 
Tomsic Savage & Campbell, Key Bank Tower Suite 1250, 50 South Main Street, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, 84144, and that in said capacity and pursuant to Rule 5(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER be delivered to the following this day of 
March, 2001 by: 
[ X ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile No. 
[ ] Depositing the same in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Federal Express 
[ ] Certified Mail, Receipt No. , return receipt requested 
Reed L. Martineau, Esq. 
Rex E. Madsen, Esq. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Attorneys for Counterclaim Defendants and Plaintiffs 
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IT ?•' 
u 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
FAIRFAX REALTY, INC., Formerly 
PRICE DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, a 
Utah corporation, NORTH PLAINS 
LAND COMPANY, LTD., a Utah 
limited partnership, and NORTH 
PLAINS DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, LTD. 
a Utah limited partnership, 
Plaintiffs and 
Counterclaim Defendants. 
vs. 
ARMAND L. SMITH, Individually 
and as Trustee for the Armand L. 
Smith, Jr. Trust and the Shannon 
S. Windham Trust, and VIRGINIA 
L. SMITH, 
Defendants and 
Counterclaimants• 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CIVIL NO. 940904312 
Now before the Court are several Motions, including 
defendants' Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, Motion 
for a New Trial or in the Alternative for a Remittitur, Objections 
to Attorney's Fees, Costs, and Objections to Proposed Special 
Findings in connection with the punitive damage award. 
As to the Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, the 
Court is of the opinion that the defendants have failed to marshal 
the evidence in favor of the jury's verdict, and have failed to 
demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient to support the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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FAIRFAX REALTY 
V. SMITH PAGE 2 MINUTE ENTRY 
verdict. The Court has previously ruled that due to ambiguities in 
the contract, the parties1 intent at the time the contract was 
entered into would be a question of fact for the jury. There was 
evidence submitted on both sides of this issue and on the other 
issues to be decided by the jury, and the Court is of the opinion 
that there was sufficient evidence to support the juryfs verdict. 
Accordingly, the defendants' Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding 
the Verdict is denied. 
As to the Motion for a New Trial or Remittitur, the Court has 
reviewed the evidence and finds there is reasonable evidence upon 
which the jury could have based its punitive damage verdict, 
including evidence that Price Development failed to timely disclose 
to the Smiths the execution of the contribution agreements, leading 
them to believe that certain options were open to them in 
connection with the transactions surrounding the property, that the 
defendants submitted misleading information to plaintiffs in 
connection with plaintiffs1 interest in the REIT, that the 
defendants did not make known to the Smiths the defendants' own 
calculation of the plaintiffs' interest in the REIT until several 
years after litigation was brought by the Smiths to obtain an 
accounting, and that the Smiths were never advised by the 
defendants as to certain potential conflicts existing in connection 
with the conveyance of the property to Price Development Company, 
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FAIRFAX REALTY 
V. SMITH PAGE 3 MINUTE ENTRY 
a Maryland limited partnership. The jury could also reasonably 
find that the value of the defendant as of the end of December, 
1999, was $37 million. 
Accordingly, the alternative Motion for a New Trial or a 
Remittitur is denied. 
Defendants have objected to the proposed Judgment on the 
Special Verdicts and to the Special Findings of the Court on the 
punitive damage verdict of the jury. The Court has reviewed the 
objections and determines that they are without merit and will deny 
the same, with the exception that the following paragraphs should 
be deleted from the Special Findings. 
The paragraph in the Special Findings beginning, "That in the 
partnership accountings of 1992 and 1993, partnership tax 
deductions and partnership phantom income were wrongfully, unfairly 
and improperly allocated...." should be deleted from the Court's 
Special Findings. 
With regard to attorney's fees, the Court is of the opinion 
that the amount charged is not excessive, and that those amounts 
charged for settlement negotiations and for challenges to the 
jurisdictional aspect of this case in which the defendants did 
prevail, nevertheless should be awarded to the Smiths for the 
reason that they clearly prevailed on this litigation and under 
Utah law are entitled to all of their reasonable attorneyfs fees. 
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FAIRFAX REALTY 
V. SMITH PAGE 4 MINUTE ENTRY 
The Court is not willing to determine which individual Motions the 
defendants, Price Development Company and others, may have 
prevailed upon and reduce the attorney's fees by those amounts. 
As to costs, the Court is in agreement with defendants Price 
Development Company, et al., and will award costs in the total 
amount of $7,13 3.26. The Court has disallowed costs in the amount 
of $37,803.65. 
Counsel for Smiths is to prepare an additional Judgment on the 
Special Verdicts which includes the supplemental findings as 
indicated by the Court, and includes an attorneyfs fee award of 
$517,611.40, and $7,133.26 in costs. 
Dated this .day of June, 2000. 
FRANK 
DISTR 
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FAIRFAX REALTY 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Minute Entry, to the following, this day of June, 
2000: 
Robert S. Campbell, Jr. 
Attorney for Counterclaim Plaintiffs Smith 
50 S. Main, Suite 1250 
P.O. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0340 
James E. Magleby 
Attorneys for Counterclaim Plaintiffs Smith 
201 S. Main, Suite 600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Reed L. Martineau 
Rex E. Madsen 
Korey D. Rasmussen 
Attorneys for Defendants Price 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
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We would submit again, your Honor, that, call it 
what you will, whether it be prejudgment interest or loss of 
the use of money, it's the same thing. And as the Court 
correctly pointed out in chambers, the Utah Supreme Court has 
not made any exception for the prejudgment interest in the 
context of a breach of fiduciary duty. We submit it on that 
basis. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 
Mr. Campbell. 
MR. CRMPEELL: Your Honor, I will be very short. 
I have the second Wernick case in my hand right now 
and I111 pass that up to the Court. But this did involve a 
breach of fiduciary duty with regard to property, to real 
property, two parcels of real property that were jointly held 
in trust by the fiduciary and another party. And the court 
found in that case that more than seven years prior to trial 
that Macks had breached his fiduciary duty with respect to the 
operation of that property. 
I would be happy to submit that to the Court. 
THE COURT: All right. Thanks. 
Well, it occurs to the Court that this is a case of 
first impression in Utah. It appears to be an exception in a 
fiduciary duty context. And my feeling would be, after 
reviewing these, that the Supreme Court would undoubtedly rule 
that if it can be shown that one has breached a fiduciarv duty 
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1 by misappropriating assets or money, that, in fairness and 
2 equity, they should be forced to account for that money as 
3 well as any profits or interest gained by the use of the 
4 injured party's money. And that element of damage sought in 
5 this case by the plaintiffs should be allowed in order to make 
6 the plaintiffs whole in event it is shown that there is a 
7 breach of a fiduciary duty. 
8 I think I will allow it. If the Supreme Court 
9 disagrees with me — wefll submit it to the jury so we can 
10 tell on how they ruled on all the elements of damages. 
11 MR. CAMPBELL: All right, your Honor. Thank you. 
12 THE COURT: We!ll deal with that in that fashion. 
13 MR. CAMPBELL: We have a record being made. Would 
14 the Court like an order on that issue because it was part of a 
15 Motion in Limine? 
16 THE COURT: Yeah. I believe, since it was part of a 
17 Motion in Limine, an order would be appropriate. So I! 11 have 
18 you prepare that, Mr. Campbell. 
19 We!ll take a recess and bring the jury in and get 
20 started. 
21 (Break taken.) 
22 THE COURT: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. 
23 Letfs go back on the record. 
24 MR. MADSEN: Your Honor, may we approach the bench. 
25 THE COURT: Yes, you may. 
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1 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
If you find that Price Development Company has breached its 
fiduciary duty to the Smiths or breached its partnership contracts, 
or converted the partnership properties, you shall then award to 
Smiths the damages which you find from a preponderance of the 
evidence, will fairly and reasonably compensate the Smiths for the 
injuries sustained. 
In the case of a breach of fiduciary duty, the benefit which 
Price Development Company would have derived from the breach may be 
of a continuing nature up to the time of trial, and if so, the 
limited partners, Smiths, will be entitled to the time value of the 
monies on the amount of damages sustained by the Smiths since the 
date of the breach of the fiduciary duty to the date of trial. 
4 
(25) 
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:E>]RX OE DEVELOPMENT COMPANY 
35 CENTURY PARK WAY Telephone (301) 436-3911 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84115 Telecopier/Fax (801) 436-7653 
F A X T R A N S M I S S I O N ffOFtM 
TO; Armand Smith 
COMPANY: Armand Smith & Associates 
FAX #: (505) 769-1619 
FROM: Paul K. Mendenhail 
DEPARTMENT s Finance 
NUMBER OF PAGES (excluding cover sheet); 1 
DATE: December 1, 1993 
TIME SENT: 2035 
DEPARTMENT CODE: 40 
PROJECT CODE: REIT 
REMARKS: Attached is the sheet we discussed tonight. This is only 
an estimate- Please call if we can discuss this further. 
PKM 
THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THiS FACSIMILE MESSAGE IS PRIVILEGED AND 
CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE INTENDED RECIPIENT 
NAMED ABOVE. IF YOU ARE NOT THE INTENDED RECIPIENT, YOU ARE HEREBY NOT I if I ED THAT 
ANY COPYING OF THIS COMMUNICATION OH DISSEMINATION OK DISTRIBUTION OF IT TO 
ANYONE OTHER THAN THE INTENDED RECIPIENT IS STRICTLY PROHIBITED, IF YUC HAVE 
RECEIVED THIS COMMUNICATION IN ERROR, PLEASE IMMEDIATELY NOTIFY US BY TELEPHONE 
AND RETURN THE ORIGINAL MESSAGE TO US AT THE ABUVE ADDRESS VIA U>5. POSTAL 
SERVICE, 
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^ PLAINS MRU. 
J7ATIQN OF ESTIMATES VALUE 
.IBS) 29, 1993 
NET GPEaPTiNS INCGBE FOR THE PARTNERSHIP 
LESS INTEREST FOR DEBT IF NOT PAIS OFF 
LESS NE* EXPENSE RELATED TO PUBLIC REIT 
(510 ,000 DIVIDED BY 3 3 . 2 0 0 , 0 0 0 = ( . 0 1 3 3 6 1 ; TI«£= A) 
FJNDS FRCfl OPERATIONS 
HESSSVE FOR CAPITAL EXPENDITURES AND WGfiKINE CAPITAL (7 .51) 
PAYOUT PERCENTAGE 
Fl?lD£ AVAILABLE FuS DISTRIBUTION 
CAPITALIZATION i&TE 
SRGSS yPLL'E BEFORE DEBT REPAYMENT. PREPflYKENT P E N 3 . 7 I 3 , 
AND CFFESINB EXPENSES 
LESS DE3T FEFAYJOT 
LESS SCCSliED INTERS? CN DEBT 
LESS ? R & W E n PENALTIES ON DET 
LESS f?HTS?Ca«PfiNY LOAN PAYMENT 
PLUS M?T- "EL-T ALLOCATION 
LESS ! € * EXPENSES ON f € ^ DEBT ( . 0393 TIffia ill 
LESS PUBLIC 0FFERIN8 EXPENSES 
( 2 , 2 5 0 , 0 0 0 DIVIDED 3Y £ 9 1 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 - ( ,00300?) " ! € 3 Hi 
LESS UNBEEWSi-TNG CGS7S AND EXPENSES 70 RAISE CPFITfiL TO PBV EXISTING 2 S 7 
( U , W 7 , 0 0 0 DIVIDES 3Y 1 8 7 , 5 0 0 , 0 0 0 = ( .08*05; T I B S I PLUS L; 
ESTIMATED NET W U E GF THE PfiRTOESHIP 
ESTIMATED INITIAL DIVIDEND <G HUES Q) 
ESTIMATED TOTAL PfifuT^SHI? UNITS '2 DIVIDED 3Y U 3 . E 5 PE? S-AFE) 
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PRICE DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, 
L1MITED DAPTNERSH|P 
35 CENTURY PARK-WAY • SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84115 
A-
TELEPHONE (801) 486-3911 
TELECOPIER FAX (801) 486-7653 
March 8, 1994 Via Facsimile 
Original by Regular Mail 
Armand L. Smith 
P.O. Box 159 
Clovis, New Mexico 88101 
Re: North Plains Mall 
Dear Armand: 
2 PLAINTIFFS 
i EXHIBIT 
I^ivil No. 940904312CV 
DSITION 
CHIBIT 
Pursuant to our conversation of Thursday February 24 you will find 
enclosed the following documents: 
1. A copy of the original computation of estimated value 
showing the allocation of 8,793 units in the new 
operating partnership to North Plains Mall, Your 
allocation of units is based on your 15% ownership 
interest (8,793 units x 15% = 1,319 units), and the 
issuance of units for the principal portion of your 
partner loan ($230,640 / $17.50 per unit = 13,179 units). 
The combined total units allocated to you would be 14,498 
units. The value of the units is initial offering price 
of the REIT stock. Siibsequent_to._the^ffering^he.jy^lue 
of the units will be equivalent to the value of the 
publicly traded shares. 
2. A copy of the revised computation of estimated value 
schedule with the full accrual of interest on the partner 
loans. Based on the computation the partnership would be 
allocated 2,348 units in the operating partnership. The 
allocation of units based on your ownership of 15% would 
be 352 units. 
3. A copy of the balance sheets and a source and application 
of the due to managing general partner account for the 
period from December 31, 1988 through December 31, 1992; 
and 
4. A copy of the same information starting October 31, 1989, 
showing the activity for the two months ending December 
31, 1989. This schedule shows the change in the 
intercompany account for the general partner from the 
time of the capital call which was never picked up with 
the final settlement. 
Based on our discussion, we would pay you the principal amount of 
your partner loan in the amount of $230,640 plus allocate to you 
35 2 units in the operating partnership. The allocation of the Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Armand L. Smith 
March 8, 1994 
Page 2 
units should make the transaction non-taxable. You should, 
however, consult with your tax advisor relative to any negative 
basis gains and the handling of your own personal tax 
considerations. If you have specific tax questions regarding the 
transaction, please call me and I will put you in touch with our 
tax advisor on this transaction. 
Please review the enclosed items, 
call. 
If you have questions, please 
erply, 
1^ 2^ . 
laul K. Mendenhall 
cc: John Price 
Warren P. King 
G. Rex Frazier 
Martin G. Peterson 
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JAN-17-1994 Q2:i5 PRICE DEVELOPMENT P 09 
PUTflTION OF ESTIMATED VALi£ 
mJARY 12, 1994 
NET OPERATING INCTE FOR Tt€ PARD^RSHIP 
LESS INTEREST FDR DEBT IF NOT PAID OFF 
LESS NEU EXPENSE RELATED TO PUBLIC REIT 
(510,000 DIVIDED BY 3 3 , 2 0 0 , 0 0 0 = ( . 0 1 3 6 1 ) T H E A) 
FUNDS FRCK 0PE3AT1CWS 
RESERVE FDR CAPITOL EXPENDITURES AND WORKING CAPITAL ( & . W 
PAYOUT PERCSNTAS 
FUNDS AVAILABLE FOR DISTRIBUTION 
CAPITALIIATICN RATE 
6R0SS VALUE BEFORE DEBT REPAYME>rr, PREPAYMENT PENALTIES, 
m OFFERING EXPENSE 
LEES DEBT REPAYMENT 
LESS ACCRUED INTEREST ON DEBT 
LEES P R E P A Y S PENALTIES ON DEBT 
LESS INTERCOMPANY LOAN PAYt€KT ( 1 , 5 7 7 , 7 4 4 ) 
PUIS HEii DEBT ALLOCATION A, BOO, 000 ^ 
LESS NEW EXPENSES CM £ U DEBT ( .0430 T1)€S «) (20&,±00) ' 
LESS PUBLIC OFFSRINB EXPENDS 
( 2 , 6 0 0 , 0 0 0 DIVIDED BY 2 £ 2 , 5 0 0 , 0 0 0 = ( .009905) T I E S W ( 92 ,083 ) V 
LESS UNDERWRITING COSTS AND EXPENSES TO RAISE CAPITAL TO PAY EXISTING DEBT 
(1^ ,200 ,000 DIVIDED BY 17A, 000 ,000 = ( ,09310) T I I O I PLUS L) (747 ,095) ./ 
1 , 2 0 9 , 3 0 0 
(319 ,200) 
aeo,100 
94.00* 
a&,694 
9.00% 
9,296,&00 
(11,244,906) 
(72,500) 
/ £ 
/ 
-V 
s?i 
1*/ <r >C 
ESTIMATED NET VALUE OF Tfe PART>€RSHIP 1 5 3 , 8 7 2 
ESTIMATED INITIAL DIVIDEND (S TIMES Q) l 3 , a 4 B 
ESTIMATED TOTAL PARTTOSHIP UNITS (0 DIVIDED BY 117 .50 PER SHARE) 8 , 7 9 3 
JXATIGN IF UNITS 
mm PLAINS LAND C W W Y i^Tcg 
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PLAINS MALL 
FATION OF ESTIMATED VALUE 
RY 12, 1994 
NET OPERATING INCOME FOR THE PARTNERSHIP 1,209,300 
LESS INTEREST FOR DEBT IF NOT PAID O F (319,200) 
LESS f O EXPENSE RELATED TO PUBLIC REIT 
(510,000 DIVIDED BY 33,000,000 = (.01545) TIMES A) 
FUNDS FROM OPERATIONS 890,100 
RESERVE FOR CAPITAL EXPENDITURES AND WORKING CAPITAL (6.9*) 
PAYOUT PERCENTAGE 94.0OS 
FUNDS AVAILABLE FOR DISTRIBUTION 
CAPITALIZATION RATE 
GROSS VALUE BEFORE DEBT REPAYMENT, PREPAYMENT PENALTIES, 
AND OFFERING EXPENSES 
LESS DEBT REPAYMENT 
LESS ACCRUED INTEREST ON DEBT 
LESS PREPAYMENT PENALTIES ON DEBT 
LESS INTERCOMPANY LOAM PAYMENT (1,630,916) 
PLUS NEW DEBT ALLOCATION 4,800,000 
LESS NEW EXPENSES ON NEW DEBT (3,966,000 DIVIDED 95,000,000 = (.0417) TIMES M) (206,400) 
LESS PUBLIC OFFERING EXPENSES 
(2,600,000 DIVIDED BY 262,500,000 = (.009905) TIMES H (92,083) 
LESS UNDERWRITING COSTS AND EXPENSES TO RAISE CAPITAL TO PAY EXISTING DEBT 
(16,200,000 DIVIDED BY 174,000,000 = (.09310) TIMES I PLUS L PLUM M! (756,700) 
636,694 
9.00* 
9,296,600 
(11,246,906) 
(72,500) 
ESTIMATED NET VALUE OF THE PARTNERSHIP 41,095 
ESTIMATED INITIAL DIVIDEND (G TIMES Q) 3,699 
ESTIMATED TOTAL PARTNERSHIP UNITS 10 DIVIDED BY $17.50 PER SHARE) 2,348 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-flINS MALL 
SHEETS - TAX 
S AND EQUITY 
12-31-88 12-31-89 12-31-90 12-31-91 12-31-92 
ATE 
D 
LDIN6S AND IMPROVEMENTS 
NITURE, FIXTURE AND EQUIPMENT 
JHULATED DEPRECIATION 
AND NOTES RECEIVABLE 
CHARGES 
JMILATED AMORTIZATION 
5ETS 
1,625,000 1,625,000 1,625,000 1,625,000 1,625,000 
8,225,000 10,593,000 10,629,000 10,837,000 10,824,000 
( 1
'
5 a a
'
0 0 0 )
 (2,136,000) (2,666,000) (3,215,000) (3,776,000) 
8,262,000 10,062,000 9,588,000 9,247,000 8,673,000 
(45,000) 21,000 3,000 2,000 2,000 
3,000 11,000 2,000 
460,000 589,000 594,000 582,000 498,000 
(146,000) (236,000) (329,000) (359,000) (326,000) 
B. 534, OOP 10,467,000 9,856.000 9,474,000 8.847, 000 
NflGINS GENERAL PARTNER 
NTEREST PAYABLE 
PAYABLE AND ACCRUED EXPENSES 
DEFICIT 
rY 
HBUTIONS 
€ (LOSS) 
9,500,000 12,000,000 12,000,000 12,000,000 11,720,000 
1,405.000 2,159.000 856,000 1,104,000 1.240,000 
130,000 186,000 162,000 102,000 
000 10,505,000 14,289,000 13,042,000 l3,26o,CK)0 13,062, 
(1,491,000) (2,371,000) (3,822,000) (3,186,000) (3,792,000) 
1,552,000 
(880,000) (1,451,000) (916,000) (606,000) (423,000) 
(2,371,000) (3,822,000) (3,186,000) (3,792,000) (4,215, 000) 
8,534,000 10,467,000 9,856,000 9,474,000 8,847, 000 
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PLAINS MALL 
3 MANA6IN6 6BERflL PARTNER - SOURCE AND APPLICATION - TAX 
IS OF ADVANCES 
NET INCOME (LOSS) 
ADD BACK DEPRECIATION 
INCREASE IN ACCRUED INTEREST PAYABLE 
INCREASE IN ACCOUNTS PAYABLE 
INCREASE IN LOAN OUTSTANDING 
CAPITAL CONTRIBUTION 
»TION OF ADVANCES 
INCREASE IN BUILDINGS 
INCREASE IN FURNITURE AND FIXTURES 
INCREASE IN DEFERRED CHARGES 
INCREASE IN OTHER ASSETS 
MORTGAGE LOAN PAYMENTS 
INCREASE IN ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE 
DURCES (APPLICATION) 
4ING BALANCE OF DUE TO MANAGING PARTNER 
3 BALANCE OF DUE TO MANAGING PARTNER 
PERIOD 
12-31-89 12-31-90 12-31-91 12-31-92 TOTAL 
(1,451,000) (916,000) (606,000) (423,000) (3,396,000) 
638,000 623,000 579,000 528,000 2,368,000 
0 
130,000 56,000 (24,000) (60,000) 102,000 
2,500,000 2,500,000 
1,552,000 1,552,000 
1,817,000 1,315,000 (51,000) 45,000 3,126,000 
2,368,000 36,000 208,000 (13,000) 2,599,000 
0 
129,000 5,000 (12,000) (84,000) 38,000 
0 
280,000 280,000 
74,000 (29,000) 1,000 (2,000) 44,000 
2,571,000 12,000 197,000 181,000 2,961,000 
(754,000) 1,303,000 / (248,000) (136,000) 165,000 
(1,405,000) (2,159,000) (B56,0OO) (1,104,000) (1,405,000) 
(2,159,000) (856,000) (1,104,000) (1,240,000) (1,240,000) 
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PLAINS MflLL 
E SHEETS - TAX - STARTING 10-31-89 
10-31-89 12-31-89 12-31-90 12-31-91 12-31-92 
ITATE 
iND 
HLDIN6S AND IMPROVEMENTS 
RNITURE, FIXTURE AKD EQUIPMENT 
CUMULATED DEPRECIATION 
3 AND NOTES RECEIVABLE 
3 CHARGES 
:iMJLATED AMORTIZATION 
3SETS 
1,625,000 1,625,000 1,625,000 1,625,000 1,625,000 
10,302,000 10,593,000 10,629,000 10,837,000 10,824,000 
(2,046,000) (2,136,000) (2,666,000) (3,215,000) (3,776,000) 
9,881,000 10,082,000 9,588,000 9,247,000 8,673,000 
20,000 21,000 3,000 2,000 2,000 
9,000 11,000 2,000 
480,000 589,000 594,000 582,000 498,000 
(219,000) (236,000! (329,000) (359,000) (326,000) 
10.171,000 10,467,000 9,856,000 9,474,000 8.847,000 
IS AND EQUITY 
GS 
ANAGIN6 GENERAL PARTNER 
INTEREST PAYABLE 
PAYABLE AND ACCRUED EXPENSES 
3 DEFICIT 
ITY 
rRIBUTIONS 
W (LOSS) 
12,000,000 12,000,000 12,000,000 12,000,000 11,720,000 
1,552,000 2,159,000 B56,000 1,104,000 1,240,000 
179,000 130,000 186,000 162,000 102,000 
13,731,000 14,289,000 13,042,000 13,266,000 13,062,000 
(2,371,000) (2,371,000) (3,822,000) (3,186,000) (3,792,000) 
1,552,000 
(1,189,000) (1,451,000) (916,000) (606,000) (423,000) 
(3,560,000) (3,822,000) (3,186,000) (3,792,000) (4,215,000) 
10,171,000 10,467,000 9,856,000 9,474,000 8,847,000 
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PLAINS MALL 
MANAGING GENERAL PARTNER - SOURCE AND APPLICATION - TAX - STARTING 10 -31 -89 
S Of ADVANCES 
NET INCOME (LOSS) 
ADD BACK DEPRECIATION 
INCREASE IN ACCRUED INTEREST PAYABLE 
INCREASE IN ACCOUNTS PAYABLE 
INCREASE IN LOAN OUTSTANDING 
CAPITAL CONTRIBUTION 
ATIDN OF ADVANCES 
INCREASE IN BUILDINGS 
INCREASE IN FURNITURE AND FIXTURES 
INCREASE IN DEFERRED CHARGES 
INCREASE IN OTHER ASSETS 
MORTGAGE LOAN PAYMENTS 
INCREASE IN ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE 
BJRCES (APPLICATION) 
1INB BALANCE OF DUE TO MANAGING PARTNER 
i BALANCE OF DUE TO MANAGING PARTNER 
2 MONTHS PERIOD 
10-31-89 12-31-90 12-31-91 12-31-92 TOTAL 
(262,000) (916,000) (606,000) (423,000) (2 ,207 ,000) 
107,000 623,000 579 ,000 528,000 1 ,837 ,000 
0 
(49,000) 56,000 (24,000) (60,000) (77,000) 
0 
1,552,000 1,552,000 
(204,000) 1,315,000 (51,000) 45,000 1,105,000 
291,000 36,000 208,000 (13,000) 522,000 
0 
109,000 5,000 (12,000) (84,000) 18,000 
0 
280,000 280,000 
3,000 (29,000) 1,000 (2,000) (27,000) 
403,000 12,000 197,000 181,000 793,000 
(607,000) 1,303,000 (248,000) (136,000) 312,000 
(1,552,000) (2,159,000) (856,000) (1,104,000) (1,552,000) 
(2,159,000) (856,000) (1,104,000) (1,240,000) (1,240,000) 
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Schedule E 
NORTH PLAINS MALL 
COMPUTATION OF ESTIMATED VALUE (FINAL) • 
A. NET OPERATING INCOME FOR THE PARTNERSHIP 1,209,300 
B. LESS INTEREST FOR DEBT IF NOT PAID OFF 019,200) 
C LESS NEW EXPENSE RELATED TO PUBLIC RETT 
(510,000 DIVIDED BY 33400,000-(.015361) TIMES A) f 18,376) 
D. FUNDS FROM OPERATIONS 871,524 
E. RESERVE FOR CAPITAL EXPENDITURES AND WORKING CAPITAL (6.0H) 
PAYOUT PERCENTAGE 94.00% 
F. FUNDS AVAILABLE FOR DISTRIBUTION 819,233 
G. CAPITALIZATION RATE 1*2% 
H. GROSS VALUE BEFORE DEBT REPAYMENT. PREPAYMENT PENALTIES, 
AND OFFERING EXPENSES 9,508,707 
L LESS DEBT REPAYMENT (11,246,906) 
J. LESS ACCRUED INTEREST ON DEBT (72^00) 
K. LESS PREPAYMENT PENALTIES OK DEBT 
L. LESS INTERCOMPANY LOAN PAYMENT- TENANT IMPROVEMENTS 0,577,744} 
M. PLUS NEW DEBT ALLOCATION 4,800,000 
N. LESS NEW EXPENSES ON NEW DEBT (.0430 TIMES M) (206,400) 
O. LESS PUBLIC OFFERING EXPENSES 
(2,600,000 DIVIDED BY 262^00,000 -(.009905) TIMES H) (94,184) 
P. LESS UNDERWRmNG COSTS AND EXPENSES TO RAISE CAPTIAL TO PAY EXISITNGDEBT 
(16,200,000 DIVIDED BY 174,000,000 - (.09310) TIMES I PLUS L) 041.095) 
Q. ESTIMATED NET VALUE OF THE PARTNERSHIP 363.178 
R. ESTIMATED INITIAL DIVIDEND (G TIMES Q) 31.350 
S. ESTIMATED TOTAL PARTNERSHIP UNITS (Q DIVIDED BY S17J0 PER SHARE) 20.793 
EFFECTIVE GROSS VALUE UTILIZED (H PLUS M MINUS N) - assurninf that the other additional 
partner advance of SI ,537,600 is treated as capita] and not u a partner loan. 14,107-307 
Prepared 1/12/2000 to reflect the final valuation and units allocated to this partnership. I DEFENDANT'S i EXHIBIT 1 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
K. Norman's Damage Calculations 
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Schedule A2 
Method 1 
Value of North Plains Mall Based on Mr. Howden's Appraisal on January 1, 1994 
Various Treatments of Debt 
Measurement of Smiths' Partnership interests as of 3/15/01 
1 Value per Howden Appraisal (1/1/94) 
2 Less: Mortgage Loan Repayment 
3 Value of Partnership Interests (Net of Chemical Bank Mortgage) (Line 1 less Line 2) 
4 Less: Intercompany Loan Repayment 
5 Less: Price Capital/Loan Repayment 
6 Less: Smith Capital/Loan Repayment 
7 Estimated Net Value of Partnership (Line 3 less Lines 4-6) 
8 Smiths' Ownership Percentage 
9 Value of Smiths' Partnership Interests (Line 6 multiplied by Line 7) at 1/1/94 
10 Plus: Adjustment for Time Value of Smiths' Partnership interests at BankOne 
Prime +2% (1/1/94 to 3/15/01) 
11 Value of Smiths' Partnership Interests at 3/15/01 (Line 9 plus Line 10) 
Measurement of Smiths' Debt interests as of 3/15/01 
12 Beginning Loan Balance of Smiths' as of approximately January 1990 
13 Plus: Adjustment for Time Value of Smiths' Loan Balance at BankOne Prime 
+2% (1/1/90 to 1/1/94) 
14 Value of Smiths' Debt interests as of 1/1/94 (Line 12 plus Line 13) 
15 Plus: Adjustment for Time Value of Smiths' Loan Balance at BankOne Prime 
+2% (1/1/94 to 3/15/01) 
16 Value of Smith's Debt Interests as of 3/15/01 (Line 14 plus Line 15) 
Measurement of Smiths' Combined Partnership and Debt interests as of 3/15/01 
17 Value of Smiths' Partnership and Debt Interess at 3/15/01 (Line 11 plus Line 16) 
18 Plus: Legal and Expert Witness costs for claimed breach of fiduciary duties 
and/or claimed breach of Partnership Contract. 
19 Total Value Due Smiths' with Legal and Accounting Fees (Line 17 plus Line 19) 
Analysis Two 
$ 16,000,000 
11,281,906 
4,718,094 
1,525,024 
1,869,751 
373,297 
950,022 
15% 
142,503 
147,470 
$ 289,974 
$ 258,390 
114,907 
373,297 
386,309 
H 759,606 
" 1 1,049,579 
356,800 
$ 1,406,379" 
Footnotes: 
Includes Mortgage Loan, Includes Intercompany Loan, Includes Partner Capital/Loan Z PLAINTIFF'S 
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NORTH PLAINS DEVELOPMENT COMPANY 
AGREEMENT OF LIMITED PARTNERSHIP 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ARTICLE SUBJECT PACE 
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REIMBURSEMENT 4 
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Section 7.2 Ground Lease 4 
Section 7.3 Management Agreement 5 
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Section 7.5 Leasing Agreement 5 
Section 7.6 Limited Partner Approval . . . 5 
Section 7.7 Management Compensation; 
Reimbursement 6 
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8 COMPENSATION OF PARTNERS 7 
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Section 9.4 Interest on Loans to 
Partnership 12 
Section 9.5 Notice of Borrowings 12 
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Section 10.2 Accounting Records; Annual 
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ARTICLE 2 
PRINCIPAL PLACE OF BUSINESS 
The principal place of business of the Partnership shall be 
located m Curry County at the location of the property, with its 
principal management offices being located at 35 Century Park-Way, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115, or at such ether place as the 
General Partner shall hereafter determine in writing. 
ARTICLE 3 
DURATION OF PARTNERSHIP 
Section 3.1 Term. The term of this Partnership snail 
commence on the date hereof and continue thereafter for a period 
of forty-five (45) years unless sooner terminated hereunder or by 
operation of law. 
ARTICLE 4 
CAPITAL ACCOUNTS AND OWNERSHIP INTEREST 
The Partnership shall have separate capital accounts for 
each Partner to which their capital contributions, if any, their 
respective shares of profits or losses and any withdrawals or 
distributions shall from time to time be credited or charged. 
The General Partner and Limited Partners shall each contri-
bute to the Partnership and shall initially hold an interest in 
the Partnership as follows: 
CAPITAL 
PARTNER CONTRIBUTION PEPCENT 
Price Development Company $ 50 5% 
(General) 
Price Development Company $ 150 15% 
(Limited) 
John Price $ 550 55% 
Armand'L. Smith $ 150 15% 
NP Investment Company $ 100 10% 
TOTAL $1,000 1001; 
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Withdrawals of the Partnership capital will be permitted 
only as directed by the General Partner and shall be in the ratio 
of the above percentages. 
Mo interest shall be payable on any contributions to the 
capital of the Partnership. The account of each Partner shall be 
credited for ail of the Partner's contributions to the capital of 
the Partnership and shall be charged for all capital contributions 
withdrawn by or returned to that Partner in accordance with the 
foregoing provisions. Such credits and debits shall be made as 
and when the related contributions or the withdrawals or return 
of capital occur. The Partners' accounts shall not be debited or 
credited for any other transaction, including (without limitation) 
any depreciation, other expense, loss, income or gain, and any 
distribution to the Partners of their respective shares of income 
or gain,it being the understanding of the Partners that separate 
accounts shall be maintained on the books of the Partnership for 
such other transactions, items, and distributions, and they shall 
not be closed out to the Partners' accounts. The words "respec-
tive contributions" or substantially identical words used in this 
Agreement shall mean, unless the context clearly expresses a 
different meaning, the balances standing to the credit of the 
Partners in their respective capital accounts on the books of the 
Partnership, unaffected by any other Partnership accounts. 
ARTICLE 5 
PURPOSES OF PARTNERSHIP 
The purpose of the Partnership is to acquire, construct, 
develop, manage, lease, and deal with regard to certain real 
property (the "Land") and certain improvements to be constructed 
on the Land to be known as the "North Plains Mall" (the "Project") . 
The Land is located at the intersection of Mariana Boulevard and 
Prince Street in the City of Clovis, Curry County, New Mexico and 
is more particularly described on Exhibit "A" attached hereto. 
The initial interest of the Partnership in the Land is that of a 
leasehold estate. 
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The Partnership is hereby authorized to engage in such 
activities as may be incidental to the purposes statea heremancve 
and to engage in such other related businesses as may be mutually 
agreed upon by the Partners. 
ARTICLE 6 
TITLE TO ASSETS AND BANK ACCOUNTS 
All real and personal property of the Partnership shall be 
held m the name of the Partnership. All funds of the Partnership 
shall be deposited in a separate bank account or accounts in the 
name of the Partnership and may be withdrawn upon the signature 
of the General Partner or such other person or persons as may be 
designated in writing by the General Partner. 
ARTICLE 7 
MANAGEMENT, DEVELOPMENT, AND LEASING; REIMBURSEMENT 
Section 7.1 General. The General Partner shall have the 
right and duty of managing the business of the Partnership, 
including the duty of enforcing all of the obligations owed by 
third parties to the Partnership and the General Partner shall 
devote so much of its time, efforts, personnel, and resources to 
the business and affairs of the Partnership as may be required 
for the successful and profitable conduct thereof. Except as 
limited in this Agreement, the General Partner shall have the 
exclusive control over the business of the Partnership including 
the power to assign duties, hire personnel, enter into contracts 
and leases, borrow money, refinance, encumber or sell all or any 
part of the property, and to have full authority and control of 
any and all business operations of the Partnership at the expense 
of the Partnership. 
Section 7 .2 Ground Lease. The Partnership shall enter into 
a Ground Lease of Pro3ect site with North Plains Land Company, a 
Utah limited partnership. The Ground Lease shall be m the form 
of that attached hereto as Exhibit "B" and by this reference made 
a part hereof. The form and content of the Ground Lease is 
hereby approved by the Partners. 
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Section 7.3 Management Agreemert. The Partnership shall 
enter into a Management Agreement with Price Management Company, 
a Utah corporation. The Management Agreement shall be in the 
form of that attached hereto as Exhibit "C" and by this reference 
made a part hereof. The form ard content of the Management 
Agreement is hereby approved by the Partners and the Limited 
Partners hereby waive any c l a m respecting said Management 
Agreement arising cut of the existing affiliation between the 
General Partner and Price Management Company. 
Section 7.4 Development Agreement, The Partnership shall 
enter into a Development Agreement with Price Development Company, 
a Utah corporation. The Development Agreement shall be in the 
form of that attached hereto as Exhibit "D" and by this reference 
made a part hereof. The form and content of the Development 
Agreement is hereby approved by the Partners and the Limited 
Partners heresy waive any claim respecting said Development 
Agreement arising out of Price Development Companyfs status as 
the Gereral Partner hereunder. 
Section 7.5 Leasing Agreement. The Partnership shall also 
enter into a Leasing Agreement with Price Development Company. 
The Leasing Agreement shall be in the form of that attached 
hereto as Exhibit "E" and by this reference made a part hereof. 
The form and content of the Leasing Agreement is hereby approved 
by the Partners anc the Limited Partners hereny waive any claim 
respecting said Leasing Agreement arising out of Price Develop-
ment's status as General Partner hereunder. 
Section 7.6 Limited Partner Approval. The Limited Partners 
shall not have nor exercise any management right whatsoever 
except as herein provided. The General Partner, however, shall 
not, without the written consent or ratification by ninety 
percent (90°o) m interest of the Limited Partners do any of the 
following acts: 
1. Do any act m contravention of the Certificate of 
Limited Partnership. 
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2. Confess a judgment against the Partnership. 
3. Possess Partnership property, or assign specific 
Partnership property, for other than a Partnership purpose. 
4. Except as otherwise provided m Articles 12 ana 
13, admit a person or entit\ as a General Partner. 
The dissolution or witndrawal of a General Partner shall net 
dissolve the Partnership and m such event the Partnership may be 
continued b^ any then remaining General Partner(s) or by a person 
or entity selected by unanimous agreement of the Limited Partners, 
if there is not then a remaining General Partner. 
Section 7.7 Management Compensation; Reimbursement. The 
General Partner shall receive as compensation for its services as 
manager of the Partnership affairs, (I) reimbursement for any and 
all out-of-pocket expenses incurred by the General Partner on 
behalf of the Partnership and (n) a reasonable hourly rate of 
compensation for the time devoted by the General Partner's 
various personnel m furthering the Partnership's business, not 
to exceed, however, a rate of compensation which would be charged 
by third parties for performing similar services. In no event, 
however, shall the General Partner or its affiliates be compen-
sated hereunder for any services which are covered by the agree-
ments described in Sections 7.3, 7.4, and 7.5 (so long as such 
agreements remain in effect) except to the extent set forth in 
sucn agreements. 
Section 7.8 Conflict of Interest. 
(a) The General Partner, the Limited Partners, and 
their respective affiliates (including the respective directors, 
officers, and employees of each) may engage for their own account 
and/or for the account of others in other business ventures, 
including the purchase, developrent, operation, management, or 
syndication of real estate properties, eitner for tneir own 
respective or collective accounts or on behalf of otner persons, 
partnerships, joint ventures, corporations, or other entities m 
which they may have an interest, whether or not competitive with, 
or m a conflict of interest position with, the Partnership. If 
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a Partner engages m such activities, the Partnership ana the 
other Partners shall have no right to participate therein or make 
any claim as a result thereof. 
(b) The General Partner may, with disclosure to the 
Limited Partners, deal with itself, and with its affiliates, 
their officers, employees, ana agents m providing necessary 
services or goods for the Partnersnip (provided the cost of such 
goods or services is equal to or less than the cost of obtaimna 
such goods or services from thirc parties) and neither the 
Partnership nor any of the Limited Partners shall have any right 
by virtue of this Agreement, to participate m or to claim any 
interest in the income or profits derived therefrom. 
(c) Each Partner waives any rights such Partner may 
have against any other Partner for capitalizing on information 
and/or opportunities learned as a consequence of any connection 
with the affairs of this Partnership. 
ARTICLE 8 
COMPENSATION OF PARTNERS 
Except as expressly provided for m this Agreement, or m 
the Management Agreement, Leasing Agreement, or Development 
Agreement: referred no m Sections 7.3, 7.4, and 7.5, a Partner 
shall not receive any compensation (other than its respective 
share of profits) for any services which such Partner may perform 
for the Partnership. 
ARTICLE 9 
ADDITIONAL FUNDS FOR PARTNERSHIP AND DISTRIBUTIONS 
Section 9.1. Financing. No financing obtained by the 
Partnersnip shall impose any personal liability on any Limitea 
Partner or any affiliated entity of the Partnership without the 
written approval of the Partner(s) or entity personally liable 
therefor. 
Section 9.2 Capital Calls. 
(a) The Partnership shall attempt to obtain financing 
for the acquisition, development, construction, and ownership of Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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the Project in the form of an initial land loan (the "Land Loan") 
at the time the Land is acquired by the Partnership, a subsequent 
construction loan at the time construction of improvements on the 
Land commences (the "Construction Financing") and a perranent 
mortgage loan or other similar financing (the "Permanent Financ-
ing") dpcrt the completion of sucn construction. If during tne 
term of this Partnership, the Construction Financing, Permanent 
Financing, or gross cash receipts generated by the Partnership 
are not sufficient to provide working capital to meet the current 
obligations or other cash needs of the Partnership, the Partner-
ship shall use all reasonable efforts to borrow, from recognized 
and reputable lending sources, the funds needed to meet such 
obligations and/or cash needs on the strength of the Partnership's 
assets (and not necessarily on the strength of the net worth of 
the General Partner); it being the intent of the Partners to 
borrow the maximum amount of funds as the Pro]ect is able to 
sustain through first and/or second mortgages (first and/or 
second deeds of trust), so-called "gap" loans or other interim-
type financing as is reasonably prudent under the circumstances 
and is consistent with industry practice, including, if possible, 
bonds, grants, and other financing arranged through municipal, 
state and/or federal agencies. 
(b) The General Partner shall use its best efforts to 
obtain for the Partnership the Land Loan, the Construction 
Financing, the Permanent Financing, ana additional interim, "gap" 
or "second" loans and bonds and grants as are described in 
Section 9.2(a) above at such rate of interest anc for such 
principal amounts as the General Partner deems appropriate. The 
General Partner shall also utilize its best efforts to obtain the 
Permanent Financing on terms as shall impose no personal liability 
on the Partnership or tne Partners or any affiliated entities, m 
that the lender of such Permanent Financing shall lock solely to 
the value of the Project for its security. 
(c) In the event that the Partnership is unable to 
borrow all necessarv funds, then each Partner shall loan or 
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advance such additional needed funds to the Partnership in the 
proportion to its then respective Partnership interest. An^ such 
loans or advances shall be paid to the Partnership within such 
period after notice as the General Partner may specify by written 
notice to the Partners [but in no event to be less than ten (10) 
days]. Any such loans or advances by a Partner shall be reflected 
on the bocks of the Partnership as a loan, bearing interest at 
the rate of two (2) percentage points over the prime rate of 
interest then being charged by Valley Bank and Trust Company, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, but in no event shall such interest exceed 
the maximum permissible interest rate chargeable at law. The 
prime rate of interest in effect on the first day of any calendar 
month shall apply for such calendar month. A Partner as such 
lender shall, as against the Partnership, have all the rights of 
a general creditor against the interests of the other Partners in 
the Partnership. Said advances or loans to the Partnership 
together with accrued interest thereon shall be repaid m a luce 
amount and at the same time and prior to any distribution of Net 
Spendable to any General Partner as provided for in Article 11 
hereof. 
(d) Should any Partner fail to make all or any part of 
the loan or advance required of it under Section 9.2(c) next 
above on a timely basis (the "Defaultma Party") any other party 
(tne "Curing Party") may elect, but shall not be obligated, to 
lend or advance to the Partnership [in addition to the amount 
required of it pursuant to Section 9.2(c)] that portion of such 
loan or advance wmch the Defaulting Party failed to make (the 
"Curing Amount") . Commencing on the date such loan or advance 
was needed by the Partnersnip and continuing thereafter, the 
Defaulting Party shall be indebted to the Curing Party in the 
Curing Amount, which Amount shall bear interest at the rate per 
annum equal to three ana one/half (3h) percentage points above 
the prime rate of interest charged by Valley Bank and Trust 
Company, Salt Lake City, Utah; provided that in no event shall 
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such interest rate exceed the maximum interest rate permitted by 
lav*. Such indebtedness shall be secured by the Defaulting 
Party's interest in the Partnership and shall remain an obligation 
of the Defaulting Party until such obligation is either d) 
satisfied in full by the payment m cash of the Curing Amount 
plus all accrued interest or in) satisfied by an appropriate 
adjustment to the relative interests of the parties in the 
Partnership as is more fully described below. The interest rate 
described above shall be determined as of the first day of each 
calendar month and such rate, as so calculated, shall remain in 
effect for such month. All unpaid interest outstanding on the 
last day of each calendar year shall be added to the principal of 
the Curing Amount and shall bear interest thereafter to the same 
extent as the Curing Amount. If the Defaulting Party has not 
paid to the Curing Party the entire Curing Amount described 
above, together with all accrued interest, within ninety (90) 
days of the date such Curing Amount was needed by the Partnership, 
the Curing Party may, at any time thereafter, elect to convert 
the then outstanding Curing Amount, together with all unpaid 
interest, into an increased interest in the Partnership. Such 
conversion shall be at the rate of one percent (1%) of Partnership 
interest for each Twenty Thousand Dollars ($20,000.00) then owed 
by the Defaulting Party to the Curing Party if notice of such 
conversion can and is given on or before the fourth anniversary 
of the grand opening of the Project. Such conversion shall be at 
the rate of one percent (io) of Partnership interest for each 
Forty Thousand Dollars ($40,000.00) then owed by the Defaulting 
Party to the Curing Party if notice of such conversion is given 
after the fourth anniversary of the grand opening of the Project. 
Such election to so convert shall be maae in writing and may be 
given at any time following the ninety (90) day period described 
above as long as any sums are then due the Curing Party under 
this Section 9.2(d). Following receipt by the Defaulting Party 
of any such notice to convert, the Defaulting Party shall 
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have ten (10) business days in wnich to pay in cash all or a 
portion of the Curing Amount and, if all or a portion of such sum 
is not paid within such ten (10) days, the relative interests of 
the parties shall be immediately and automatically adiusted to 
reflect the conversion described above of the total amount not so 
paid. For example, if a Defaulting Party owes a Curing Party One 
Hundred Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($100,000.00) as a Curing 
Amount together with Twenty Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($20,000.00) 
in interest and the ninety (90) day and ten (10) day periods 
described above have expired without payment prior to the fourth 
anniversary of the grand opening of the Shopping Center, the 
interest of the Curing Party in the Partnership would be automati-
cally increased by six percent (6%) and the interest of the 
Defaulting Party automatically decreased by six percent (6%). 
In addition, the capital account of the Curing Party shall be 
increased by the Curing Amount ($100,000.00 in the above 
example), which Curing Amount was previously paid by the Curing 
Party to the Partnership under this Section 9.2(d). In the 
alternative to the conversion election described above, the 
Curing Party may elect to convert the Curing Amount into a demand 
loan to the Partnership bearing interest from the date the Curing 
Amount was paid to the Partnership at the rate of tnree and 
one-half percantage points (3*5%) over the prime rate of Valley 
Bank and Trust as described above. Such loan shall be treated as 
any other loan (except as to interest rate) made by a Partner to 
the Partnership under this Agreement and such loan, together with 
all accured interest, shall be repaid prior to the payment of any 
capital or net spendable to the Partners as described in Article 
11 and 14. In no event shall the Defaulting Party be liable, 
beyond its Partnership interest, for the Curing Amount. 
(e) In the event that more than one (1) Partner 
desires to participate as a Curing Party, such participation 
shall be undertaken pro rata, based upon the respective Partner-
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ship interests of tne Curing Parties, ana all rignts granted 
hereunder to Curing Parties may be exercised severally ana 
individually by eacn of such Curing Parties. 
Section 9.3 Fepatmeat of Loans. The Partnership shall not 
repay anv loans made by the Partners or make any distributions to 
tne Partners except as hereinafter provided. Before any porticr 
of such loans are repaid or any other distributions are made tc 
the Partners, all expenses of operation shall be paid, all 
amounts currently due at such time on outstanding loans from 
persons other than the Partners shall be paid, and adequate 
provision shall be made for the working capital requirements of 
the Partnership, including adequate reserves for maintenance, 
management, prcmotion, ana tax expenses. One hundred percent 
(100%) of all cash becoming available for distribution to the 
Partners shall be paid to the Partners m repayment of their 
loans to the Partnership until such loans have been repaid in 
full. All other distributions shall be made to the Partners m 
proportion to their ownership interests. 
Section 9.4 Interest on Loans to Partnership. Any funds 
loaned to the Partnership DV a Partner, or advances on behalf of 
the Partnership ov a Partner, snail be repaid to such Partner oy 
the Partnership as prcviaed for m Sections 9.2 and 9.3. Such 
loans or advances snail bear interest at the rate of two (2) 
percentage points (or tnree and one-half percentage points [3^o] 
m the case of a loan arising pursuant to Section 9.2(d)) over 
the then existing prime rate of interest chargec by Valley Bank & 
Trust Company, Salt Lake City, Utah; providea, however, in no 
event shall the rate of sucn interest exceed the maximum rate 
permitted by law. 
Section Q.5 Notice of Borrowings. The General Partner 
shall advise the Limited Partners of any significant borrowings 
by the Partnership. The General Partner shall also not enter 
into any agreement for recourse permanent financing or the 
guarantee of permanent financing either by the General Partner as 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
NPD 
Partnership Agreement 
an individual or in its General Partner capacity without first 
notifying the Limited Partners and affording them the opportunity 
to become obligatec for the repayment of such financing. 
ARTICLE 10 
ACCOUNTING 
Section 10.1 Supervision. Proper and complete books of 
account of the business of the Partnership shall be kept by or 
under the supervision of the General Partner at the principal 
management offices of the Partnership and shall be open to 
inspection or audit by any Limited Partner or by its accredited 
representative at any reasonable time during normal business 
hours. Any expense for such audit or review shall be borne by 
the Partner making such audit or review. 
Section 10.2 Accounting Records; Annual Financial Statement. 
The Partnership records shall be maintained using such method of 
accounting as the General Partner may select m accordance with 
accounting principles commonly used m the industry and in a form 
approved by the General Partner. Within ninety (90) days after 
the enc of each fiscal year, the General Partner shall furnish to 
the Limited Partners financial statements for the year just 
expired. The books ana records of account shall be used by the 
General Partner's accounting personnel and/or a firm of mcepen-
dent public accountants selected by the General Partner, to 
prepare sucn financial statements, which shall be prepared in 
accordance with accounting principles commonly used in the 
industry. 
Section 10.3 Tax Returns. The General Partner shall 
prepare the Partnership's federal and state tax returns. The 
General Partner agrees to use its best efforts to cause said 
returns and related tax information to be furnished to the 
Partners on or before April 1 of each calenaar year. For purposes 
of this Article 10, the fiscal year of the Partnership shall be 
the calendar year. 
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Section 10.4 Semi-Annual Reports. In addition to the 
Annual Statement and tax information describea above, the General 
Partner shall also, within one hundred twenty (120) days following 
the close of the first six months of each fiscal year, furnish 
the Limited Partners with a receipts and disbursements report ror 
such six-month pence. Additional receipts anc disbursements 
reports on an unaudited and informal basis shall be provided to 
the Limited Partners from time to time (but not more often tnan 
monthly), upon request of Limited Partners holding at least 
fifteen percent (15%) of the ownership interest m the 
Partnership. 
Section 10.5 Information. In addition to the accounting 
and tax reports described herein, the General Partner shall also 
keep the Limited Partners informed as to the general business 
activities of the Partnership. 
ARTICLE 11 
PROFITS AND LOSSES; DISTRIBUTIONS; CAPITAL TRANSACTIONS 
Section 11.1 Profits and Losses. Subject to the provisions 
of Article 12, the Net Spendable (as hereinafter defined) as well 
as Taxable Net Income (as hereinafter defined) of the partnersnip 
shall be allocated in accordance with the respective Partners' 
ownership interests. 
Section 11.2 Net ScQndacle. As between tne Partners ana 
notwithstanding the definitions of "Taxable Net Income" for tax 
purposes set fcrtn m Section 11.4, and "Profit and Less" for 
financial purposes set forth in Section 11.3, tne Partners*agree 
that Net Spendable snail mean the gross casn receipts generated 
by the Partnersnip from all sources (exclusive of receipts 
referred to in Section 11.6) less all expenditures in connection 
with the business of the Partnership, including the payment of 
principal and interest on all loans, the payment of all expenses 
of operation, and the establishment of reasonaole reserve for 
maintenance, management, promotion, capital, and other expenses. 
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Section 11.3 Profit and Less. The term Proi.it ana Loss 
shall mean the prorits and losses of the Partnership as determined 
by the General Partner's accounting personnel and/or the account-
ing firm, if any, employed by the Partnership for the preparation 
of the financial statements referrea to in Section 10.2. 
Section 11.4 Taxaole MPT: Income. Tne term "Taxaole Net 
Income" shall mean the net income or net loss of the Partnership 
as determined by the General Partner at the close of each fiscal 
year and reportea on the Partnership information tax return filed 
for federal income tax purposes. The rate and method of deprecia-
tion to be utilized by the Partnership shall be determined by the 
General Partner and each Partner's share of the Taxable Net 
Income as reported on the Partnership tax returns shall be 
prorated among the Partners in accordance with their respective 
ownership interests. 
Section 11.5 Distribution. Distributions of Net Spendable 
shall be made to the Partners within thirty (30) days after the 
end of each fiscal quarter of the Partnership or at the end of 
each such ether period of time as the General Partner shall 
determine. In no event, however, shall distributions of Net 
Spendable be made less often than once per fiscal year. 
Section 11.6 Applications ot Proceeds of Capital Transac-
tions . The net proceeas or a sale, conaemnation, or otner 
disposition of all or any part of the property of the Partnership, 
the net proceeas of any borrowing by the Partnership in excess of 
the capital requirements of the Partnership, and any insurance 
proceeds m excess of the costs of restoration, shall be distri-
buted to the Partners in proportion to each respective Partner's 
ownership interest. 
ARTICLE 12 
ADMISSION OF ADDITIONAL PARTNERS 
The Partners recegmze that it may be necessary or desirable 
to admit additional partners, limited or general, to the Partner-
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ship, or enter into a joint venture with others, for the purposes 
of providxng loans, additional capital, key tenant participation 
in the Project, or for other purposes. In sue* evert the General 
Partner shall negotiate the value to be received ana the otner 
terms ana conditions upon which such additional partners shall be 
admitted or the terms ana conditions of such joint venture, as 
the case may be; which terms and conditions, as to a person or 
entity not affiliated with any partner, shall be subject to the 
prior approval of Limited Partners holding at least fift^-one 
percent (51%) of the total limited partnership interests, which 
approval shall not be unreasonably withheld or delayed and which 
approval from each Limited Partner shall be deemed given if no 
response is received from such Limited Partner within fifteen 
(15) business days following delivery to it of the terms and 
conditions so requiring its approval. The terms and conditions 
for admitting as a partner a person or entity affiliated with any 
existing partner shall be subject to the approval of Limited 
Partners holding at least nmty-five percent (95%) of the total 
Limited Partnership interests. In the event additional partners 
are admitted to the Partnership hereunder, the interest of the 
General Partner and Limited Partners m this Partnership shall be 
reduced proportionately m tne ratio of their then existing 
ownership interests. In the event the Partnership enters into a 
joint venture with others, the interest of the General and 
Limited Partners m the Partnership's land (or development 
thereon) shall be reduced accordingly. 
APTICLE 13 
TRANSFERS 
Section 13.1 Transfer of Partnership Interest. A Partner 
may not sell, assign, transfer, or encumber his or its interest 
m the Partnership, whether by operation of law or otherwise, 
except as hereinafter provided in this Article 13. 
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Section 13.2 Right of First Refusal. Except as otherwise 
provided m Article 12 or this Article 13, if a Partner (the 
"offeror") receives a bona fide offer for the purchase of all or 
any portion of such Partner's interest in the Partnership, which 
offer such Partner is willing to accept, such Partner shall 
submit a true copy of said offer, which shall disclose the name 
and address of the proposed purchaser, to the other Partners (the 
"offerees"), and offer to sell such Partner's interest in the 
Partnership to the offerees for the price and on the terms set 
forth therein. The offerees shall thereupon have the absolute 
right to purchase the interest of the offeror on the terms and 
conditions set forth in such offer. The offerees shall specify 
in a notice to the offeror, sent within thirty (30) days of 
receipt of such offer, whether or not they desire to accept the 
offer of sale. In any event the offerees must agree to purchase 
the entire interest of the offeror which is offered for sale, or 
reject such offer. Should some of such offerees elect to accept 
such offer and other elect to reject such offer, the accepting 
offerees may proceed to purchase the interest of the offeror. 
The accepting offerees shall purchase such interest on a pro rata 
basis in accordance with their then interests in the Partnership. 
Failure to send such notification within thirty (30) days shall 
constitute an election to reject such offer. Upon rejection of 
such offer by all of the offerees, the offeror may sell its 
interest to the proposed purchaser whose name and address were 
disclosed in said offer, but only upon the same terms and condi-
tions set forth in said offer and within ninety (90) days after 
the rejection of such offer by the offerees; otherwise, such sale 
may not be made, and any purported sale not in accoraance herewith 
shall be null and void. 
Section 13.3 Specific Performance. The failure or refusal 
to comply with any or ail of the provisions of this Article 13 
shall entitle a Partner to specific performance of the terms, 
-17-
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covenants, and conditions of this Agreement, or any part hereof, 
in addition to any and all other remedies available at law. 
Section 13.4 Interest of Partner. An^ Partner may have a 
direct or indirect interest in any orfer submitted for the 
purchase of his or its Partnership interest or the property 
provided that such Partrer discloses the extent of his or its 
interest, direct or indirect, to the other Partners 
Section 13.5. Restrictions. Until the Project has been 
constructed, the provisions of Section 13.2 above shall not be 
operative and no Partner shall be entitled to transfer its 
interest or cause a sale of the Project during such period 
without the unanimous written consent of all Partners. 
Section 13.6. Permitted Transfers bv General Partner. 
Notwithstanding the limitations set forth m this Article 13 or 
elsewhere m this Agreement, the General Partner shall have the 
right at any time without the consent of its Partner(s) to sell, 
assign, or otherwise transfer all or any part of its interest m 
this Partnership (i) to any corporation or other entity with 
which the General Partner merges or consolidates, or which 
succeeds to all or a substantial portion of the assets of the 
General Partner by reason of any reincorporation, reorganization 
(except under the provisions of any bankruptcy law) , or acquisi-
tion of all or substantially all of the capital stock, or assets 
of the General Partner, (n) to any legal entity in which the 
General Partner owns a majority equity interest (a "subsidiary") 
or which owns a majority equity interest m the General Partner 
(a "parent") or m which a majority equity interest is owned by 
ar entity owning a majority equity interest; in the General 
Partner, (in) to any legal entity m which the General Partner 
owns an equity interest provided the General Partner agrees m 
writing, concurrently with such sale, assignment, or transfer, 
for the benefit of its Partner(s) to remain directly (financially 
and otherwise) responsible for the performance of the General 
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Partner's obligations under this Agreement, or (IV) to any 
financial institution as security or collateral for an^ loan the 
General Partner ma^ now have or hereafter obtain from any such 
financial institution. 
Section 13.7 Permitted Transfer of Limited Partner. 
Notwithstanding trie aftove provisions of tins Article 13, any 
Limited Partner may: 
1. Assign such Limited Partner's interest in the 
property to another legal entity in which such Limited Partner 
owns a majority interest provided the assigning party retains 
sole and exclusive authority to act for such legal entity, the 
same as if the assigning party were the sole owner and, provided 
further, that such legal entity irrevocably appoints in writing 
the assigning party as its general agent with full and exclusive 
authority to act for and bind it, and delivers an original, 
executed document of such appointment in recordable form to the 
other party and to the General Partner. 
2. Give, sell, convey m trust, or otherwise transfer 
all or any part of its interest m the property to a spouse, 
child, or child of any child of the assigning Limited Partner; 
provided that any transferee or transferees shall first designate 
and empower tne transferring party or some other one person to 
act for and on their collective behalf in all matters affecting 
and relating to the holding, developing, operating, leasirg, ana 
management of the interest so transferred. 
Section 13.8 Successor to Limited Partner. A party, 
including an existing Limited Partner, who becomes a successor to 
the interest of a Limited Partner shall have no right to become a 
substituted Limited Partner without first obtaining the written 
consent of the General Partner, which consent shall not be 
unreasonably witnnela. Tne cost of filing an amenaed Certificate 
of Limited Partnership shall be paid by sucn substituted Limited 
Partner. Such a successor when approved by the General Partner 
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shall become a substituted Limited Partner when the Certificate 
of Limited Partnership is amended pursuant to the Utah Uniform 
Limited Partnership Act, which amendment shall be accomplished by 
the General Partner as soon as is reasonably possible. 
ARTICLE 14 
TERMINATION AND DISSOLUTION 
With the unanimous consent of the Limited Partners the 
General Partner shall have the right at any time to terminate the 
Partnership and order the distribution of the Partnership assets. 
Otherwise the Partnership shall continue (i) until all of the 
interests in properties acquired by it and other investments made 
by it have expired, have been sold or disposed of, or have been 
abandoned; or (n) unless sooner dissolved, but only upon the 
occurrence of any of the following events: 
(a) At any time after the first anniversary of the 
grand opening of the Project, the Partners, including the General 
Partner, owning more than seventy-five percent (75%) of the 
Partnership interests may elect to dissolve the Partnership or 
sell the Partnership assets; 
(b) The dissolution (except by way or merger, consolida-
tion or corporate reorganization) or withdrawal of the General 
Partner and the failure of the remaining Partners to elect to 
continue the Partnership as provided in Section 7.6; it bema 
understood, however, that the General Partner may not withdraw 
prior to the grand opening of the Project without the unanimous 
consent of the Limited Partners; 
(c) The disposition of all of the Partnership's 
interest in real estate and other Partnersnip assets; 
(d) The dissolution of the Partnersnip by judicial 
decree or operation of law; 
(e) The expiration of forty-five (*5) years from the 
date of initial formation of the Partnersnip, unless the Partners 
unanimously agree to extend the term of the Partnership. 
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In the event of dissolution and final termination, the 
General Partner shall wind up the affairs of the Partnership and 
shall sell ali of the Partnership assets as promptly as is 
consistent with obtaining the fair market value thereof. The 
Partners shall share in the profits and losses of the business 
during dissolution in the same proportions in which they shared 
such profits and losses prior to dissolution. So long as the 
General Partner shall devote adequate time to the dissolution and 
termination of the Partnership business, it shall receive compensa-
tion during such period at the same rate as it received immediate-
ly prior to dissolution. 
Any cash remaining after all Partnership assets have been 
sold shall be paid out and distributed in the following order of 
priority: 
(a) Payment to creditors of the Partnership in the 
order of priority provided by law? 
(b) Payment to Partners for loans, advances, or 
payables owed them by the Partnership; 
(c) Payment to all Partners pro rata in repayment of 
their capital accounts; 
(d) Payment of the balance to the record owners of 
Partnership interests in proportion to their respective ownership 
interests. 
Each Partner shall look solely to the assets of the Partner-
ship for the return of his investment. If the Partnership 
property remaining after the payment or discharge of the debts 
and liabilities of the Partnership is not sufficient to return 
the investment of each Partner, such Partner shall have no 
recourse against the General Partner, its officers, employees, 
and directors or any other Partner. 
Any property distributions in kind in a liquidation shall be 
valued and treated as though the property were sold and cash 
proceeds distributed. 
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ARTICLE 15 
DEFAULTS 
Subject to the previsions of Section 9.2 above, a Partner 
shall be deemed for all purposes of this Agreement to be in 
default hereunder in the event any such Partner: (a) fails to 
perform or observe any of its obligations under this Agreement 
and such failure continues uncured for ten (10) days after 
written notice thereof from any other Partner; provided, however, 
that if the nature of such default is other than the failure to 
pay, loan, or advance money and the same cannot reasonably be 
cured within such ten (10) day period, such Partner shall not be 
deemed to be in default if it shall, within such period, commence 
such curing and thereafter diligently prosecute the same to 
completion; (b) institutes proceedings under any laws of the 
United States or of any state for the relief of debtors, files a 
voluntary petition in bankruptcy or for an arrangement or reorgani-
zation or is adjudicated to be insolvent or bankrupt, makes an 
assignment for the benefit of creditors, or consents to the 
appointment of a receiver of any substantial portion of its 
assets or all or any portion of its assets or all or any part of 
any interest it may have in the Partnership; (c) suffers (i) to 
be seized by receiver, trustee or other officer appointed by any 
court or any sheriff, constable, marshal, or other similar 
government officer, under color of legal authority, any substan-
tial portion of its assets or all or any part of any interest it 
may have in this Partnership and (ii) to be held in such officer's 
possession for a period of thirty (30) days cr longer; or (d) 
fails to secure the dismissal within sixty (60) days of any 
petition in bankruptcy or reorganization filed against it pursuant 
to any provision of any laws of the United States or any state 
for the relief of debtors. 
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ARTICLE 16 
REMEDIES FOR DEFAULT 
In the event of any Partner's default as defined in Article 
15, at any tiire thereafter so long as the defaulting Partner 
shall continue to be in default, the Partners which are not then 
in default may terminate this Agreement and dissolve the Partner-
ship in the manner prescribed in Article 15 hereof, or may 
exercise any otner remedies they may have m law or equity. 
ARTICLE 17 
CERTIFICATE OF FICTITIOUS NAME? OTHER FILINGS 
Upon the execution of this Agreement or a subsequent change 
in the membership of this Partnership, the Partners shall sign, 
cause to be filed and published in the county in which the 
principal place of business of the Partnership is situated, and 
in each county where it transacts business, a Certificate of 
Fictitious Name as required by the applicable provisions of the 
laws of the states m which such counties are located. From time 
to time, the Partners shall sign, acknowledge, record, and 
publish such other notices, certificates, statements, or other 
instruments required by any provision of law governing the 
formation of this Partnership or its conduct of business, includ-
ing, but not limited to, tne Certificate of Limited Partnership 
described below, the designation of a registered office, and/or 
the appomtmert of an agent for service of process. 
ARTICLE 18 
CERTIFICATE OF LIMITED PARTNERSHIP 
Upon the execution of this Agreement and upon a subsequent 
change in the membersnip of this Partnership, the Partners shall 
sign, acknowledge, and verify a Certificate of Limited Partnership 
or amencment thereto pursuant to the provisions of the laws of 
the State of Utah. They shall thereafter cause a copy of such 
Certificate or amendment to be filed in the office of the County 
Clerk of Salt Lake County, Utah, the county in which the principal 
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management office of the Partnership is located and shall cause 
such recorded Certificate or amendment cr a certified copy 
thereof to be recorded m the office of the appropriate governmen-
tal official m each county in which the Partnership has a place 
of business or owns real property. 
ARTICLE 19 
ATTORNEYS' TEES AND COSTS 
In the event of any legal proceeding involving the interpreta-
tion or enforcement of the rights or ooligations of the Partners 
hereunder, the prevailing party or parties shall be entitled to 
recover its reasonable attorneys' fees and costs. 
ARTICLE 20 
NOTICES 
All notices, statements, demands, or other communications 
(herein referred to as "notices") to be given under or pursuant 
to thxs Agreement shall be in writing, addressed to the Partners 
at their respective addresses as provided in Article 1 and shall 
be delivered in person or by certified or registered mail, 
postage prepaid, return receipt requested, or by telegraph or 
cable, charges prepaid. Any sucn notice shall be deemed given 
only upon actual delivery to the addressee of such notice or upon 
the date of refusal to accept such delivery by sucn addressee. 
Any Partner may from time to time change its adaress for receipt 
of notices by sending a notice to the other Partners specifying a 
new address. 
ARTICLE 21 
PARTITION 
No Partner shall have the right to partition any property of 
the Partnership during the term ot this Agreement nor shall any 
Partner make application to any court or authority having juris-
diction m the matter or commence or prosecute any action or 
proceeding for partition or the sale thereof and, upon any breach 
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of the provisions of this Article by any Partner, the other 
Partners m addition to all rights and remedies in law and in 
equity shall be entitled to a decree or order restraining and 
enjoining such application, action, or proceeding. 
ARTICLE 2 2 
VOID OR UNENFORCEABLE TER*S 
In the event any provision of this Agreement shall be held 
to be illegal or unenforceable or inoperative as a matter of law, 
the remaining provisions shall remain m full force and effect. 
ARTICLE 23 
UTAH LAW TO CONTROL 
This Agreement shall be construed m accordance with, and 
the Partnership shall be governed by, the laws of the State of 
Utah. 
ARTICLE 24 
CONSENT AND APPROVAL 
Section 24.1 Consent. In any instance in which any Partner 
shall be requested to consent to or approve of any matter with 
respect to which such Partner's consent or approval is required 
by any of the provisions of this Agreement, such consent or 
approval shall be given m writing, and shall not be unreasonably 
withheld. 
Section 2^.2 Exercise of Approval Rights. Wherever in this 
Agreement approval of any Partner is required, and unless a 
different time limit is provided herein, such approval or disap-
proval shall be given within thirty (30) days following the 
receipt of the item to be so approved or disapproved, or the same 
shall, except as hereinafter provided, by conclusively deemed to 
have been approved by sucn Partner; providea that any notice to 
which a Partner must respond within a limited period of time must 
direct the addressee's attention (by a statement which is under-
lined or in capital letters) to the applicaDle time limitation, 
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failing which the time limitation shall be as herein provided. 
Any disapproval shall specify with particularity the reasons 
therefor. 
ARTICLE 25 
REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES 
Each Partner warrants and represents the following: 
(a) That he recognizes tnat Section 4(2) of the 
Securities Act of 1933, as amended, exempts the issue and sale of 
securities from registration under such Act in transactions not 
involving any public offering, ana that he is acquiring his 
Partnership interest for his own account to be owned solely by 
him, for investment, and with no present intention of distributing, 
reselling, pledging, or otherwise disposing of his interest; 
(b) That he is fully familiar with the business 
proposed to be conducted by the Partnership and with the Partner-
ship's use and proposed use of the proceeds of the sale of the 
Partnership interests, ana has been given access at all reasonable 
times to all data, records, and other information available to 
the Partnership; 
(c) That he has been advised that his Partnership 
interest may not be sold, transferred, or otherwise disposed of 
without an effective registration statement covering said interest 
under the Securities Act of 1933 ana applicable state securities 
acts, unless registration is not required under sucn acts, and 
that he will have no rights to require registration of his 
interest under such acts, and, in view of the nature of the 
transaction, registration is neither contemplated nor likely; 
(d) That he is knowledgeable and experienced in 
financial and business matters and is capaole of evaluating the 
merits and risks of this investment, and that where necessary, he 
has employed and consulted with knowledgeable third persons in 
making this investment decision; 
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(e) That any unauthorized assignment or transfer, or 
attempted assignment or transfer, of a partnership interest shall 
be void ab initio. 
AFTICLE 26 
MISCELLANEOUS 
Section 26.1 Agreement in Counterparts. This Agreement anc 
the Statement of General Partnership may be executed in several 
counterparts and upon execution shall constitute one agreement, 
binding on the parties hereto, notwithstanding that all are not 
signatory to the original or the same counterparts. 
Section 26.2 Amendment. This Agreement may be amended by 
an agreement of all of the Partners at any time during the 
continuance of the Partnership. The Agreement may be amended or 
modified in whole or in part, but any amendment or modification 
shall be in writing and signed by all of the Partners. Any 
amendment or modification of this Agreement shall be dated, and 
where any conflict arises between the provisions of said amendment 
or modification and provisions incorporated m earlier documents, 
the most recent provisions shall be controlling. It shall not be 
necessary to revise the entire Partnership Agreement where only 
minor changes are affectea, ana alterations shall be permitted 
either on the face of this instrument, by way of addendum, or m 
an entirely new document, providing only that sucn alteration 
shall be dated and the signature of each of the Partners shall 
appear in reasonable proximity to such alteration. 
Section 26 .3 Cross-Indemnification. No Partner shall have 
authority to act for or to assume any obligation or responsibility 
on behalf of the other Partners except as expressly provided 
herein or by written agreement: signed by each of the Partners. 
Each Partner agrees to indemnify, defend, ana hold harmless the 
other Partners, including where applicable the directors, officers, 
employees, and agents of a corporate Partner, from and against 
any and all losses, claims, expenses, damages, and liabilities 
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arising out of any sucn act of or any such assumption not made 
pursuant to authorization expressly granted under this Agreement 
or pursuant to written approval of tne Partner(s) against whom 
such losses, claims, expenses, damages, or liabilities are 
asserted. 
Section 26.4 Force Maieure. Motwicnscanamg anything 
contained m this Agreement, except for any obligation to pay, 
loan, or advance any sums of money unaer the provisions of this 
Agreement, a Partner shall be excused from performing any obliga-
tion or undertaking proviaea in this Agreement, and any delay in 
the performance of any obligation under this Agreement shall be 
excused, in the event and/or so long as the performance of such 
obligation is prevented, delayed, retarded, hindered, or prohi-
bited by Act of God, fire, earthquake, flood, explosion, actions 
of the elements, war, invasion, insurrection, riot, mob violence, 
sabotage, malicious mischief, inability to procure, or unavail-
ability of, or general shortage of lanor, equipment, facilities, 
materials or supplies in the open market, failure of transporta-
tion, strikes, lockouts, action of labor unions or trade organiza-
tions, condemnation, pending litigation or appeal thereof or 
therefrom, laws or orcers of any government authority whatever, 
whether civil, military, naval, environmental, municipal, state 
or federal authority, or any otner cause (financial inability 
excepted), whether similar or dissimilar to the foregoing, not 
within the control of such Partner, respectively. 
Section 26.5 Entire Agreement. Except as described in 
Section 26.7 below, this Agreement sets forth the entire 
agreement among the Partners with regard to the subject matter 
hereof and may not be amended, modified, superseded, or cancelled 
except as hereinabove provided. Any waiver of any of the 
provisions of this Agreement shall be in writing and shall be 
executed by the Partners in the same manner as provided for 
amendments hereto. No waiver of the failure of anv Partner 
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hereto to complv with any of the provisions of this Agreement 
shall be construed to be a waiver of an} other failure of compli-
ance by such Partner with the same or otner provisions of this 
Agreement. The rights and remedies gi^en to a Partner by this 
Agreement shall be deemed to be cumulative and none of such 
rights and remedies shall be exclusive of any of the others, or 
of any other rignt or remedy at law or in equity, and no exercise 
of one right or remedy shall impair standing to exercise any 
other right or remedy. All arrangements, covenants, represen-
tations, and warranties, express and implied, oral and written, 
of the Partners with regard to the subject matter hereof are con-
tained herein, in the Exhibits hereto, and the documents referred 
to herein, or executed herewith (collectively the "Instruments"). 
No other agreements, covenants, representations, or warranties, 
express or implied, oral or written, have been made by any 
Partner to any other with respect to the subject matter of this 
Agreement. All prior and contemporaneous conversations, negotia-
tions, possible and alleged agreements and representations, 
covenants and warranties with respect to the subject matter 
hereof are waived, merged, ana superseded by this Agreement and 
the other Instruments. This is an integrated agreement. 
Section 26.6 No Brokers. Each Partner represents to each 
of the other Partners that there is no brokerage, fmcer's, or 
other similar fees or commissions payable by virtue of the 
execution of this Agreement or the consummation of the 
transaction contemplated hereby. 
Section 26.7 Incarceration. The parties hereoy recognize 
the General Partner's control provisions described in Paragraph 
12 of the Option to Purchase Real Property excuted between Price 
Development Company arc Prince Street Partnership 
(predecessor-m-mterest to Armand L. Smith) . Therefore the 
provisions of such Paragraph 12 (as contained in the First 
Amendment to Option to Purchase Real Property dated Auaust 1, 
1982) are hereby incorporated herein. 
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this Agreement 
of Limited Partnership as of the day and year first above written. 
Any individual signing this Agreement on behalf of any entity 
hereby represents and warrants that he/she is duly authorized to 
sign for, and bind, such entity. 
GENERAL PARTNER: 
PRICE DEVELOPMENT. COMPANY 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
jo* Ji , , 
On the __/
 r day of f/tf/W/HkiCK.. , 1)984, personally 
appeared before me * )?\hn rS.o<LX . as / ~ V n//Y/_^ Y~ of 
PRICE DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, a Utah corporation, ana the said 
i\ofl*i f^^^tjL^. acknowledged to me that said 
instrument was signed m behalf of said corporation by authority 
of its by-laws (or by resolution of the board of directors) and" 
said ~Joksl P\ i. o r , acknowledged to me that said 
corporation executed the same. 
Residing at Salt Lake County 
My Commission Expires: 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On the f ^ day of 7Z#,*-£/K. K2L\J , 1984, personally 
appeared before me JOHN PRICE, President of Price Development 
Company, the signer of the above certificate, who duly 
acknowledged to me that he executed the same. 
i) 
Res id ing a t S a l t Lake County 
My Comniission E x p i r e s : 
?'^W 
S'iATE OF NEW MEXICO ) 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF CURRY ) 
On the 24th day of November , 1984, personally 
appeared before me ARMAND L. SMITH, the signer of the above 
certificate, who duly acknolwedgea to me that he executed the 
Residing at: Clovis, NM 
My Commission Expires: 
11/14/88 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss, 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On the _ / day of J l/rr^LSYLh&O ^ 8 4
 f personally 
appeared before me (Xr\ 
of NP INVESTMENT COFPMY; 
y y/ r^yi-htU ,H84, na; 
-_ __. —-fttfi, the signer of the above c e r t i n c a t e , 
who duly acknowledged to me that he executed the same. 
M£^ // J Ufa L'utJ) 
Residirlg in Salt: Lake County 
My Commission Expires: 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
EXHIBIT A 
A PORTION OF THE SW 1/4 
SECTION 5, T2N. , R.36E., N.M.PM. 
CITY OF CLOVIS 
CURRY COUNTY 
NEW MEXICO 
BEGINNING at a point on the \ Section Line, said point being in the Scutn 
Right-of-Way of Marvin Mass Boulevard and from whence the west H corner 
of said Section 5 bears S89°58»00,,W 240. 00'; THENCE N89°58,00"E along 
the South Right-of-Way of Marvin HabS Boulevard a distance of 767.31'; 
THENCE along an arc of a curve to the right having a radius of 265.11' 
a central angle of 59°58,06" a distance of 277.48' said arc at curve 
being along the Westerly Right-of-Way of Marvin Hass Boulevard; THENCE 
S30°03'54"E along the Westerly Right-of-Way of Marvin Hass Boulevard a 
distance of 1010.17'f THFNCE S89°57,00MW along the North line of a 
dedicated alley a distance of 597,24r to a point in the West Right-of-Way 
of Eastridge Drive; THENCE S0°12,23"W along the West Right-of-Way cf 
Eastridge Drive a distance of 90. 00 ' ;~ THENCE S89°59,15"W along the nortr. 
line of a dedicated alley a distance of 910.00'; THENCE N0°14,24"E a 
distance of 130,00'; THENCE SB9°59'15''W a distance of 200.00' to a point 
in the East Right-of-Way of North Prxnce Street; THENCE NO 14'24',c alone 
the East Right-of -Way of North Prince Street a distance of 786.75'; THi:r',CI 
N89°58*0Q"E along a line parallel to the South Right-of-way of Marvin Has? 
Boulevard a distance of 200.00'; THENCE NO 14'24"E along a line parallel 
to the East Right-of-Way of North Prince Street a distance of 180.00' to 
point of beginning, and CONTAINING 33,465 ACRTS more or less. 
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